

Conclusions

Variations in Factional Politics

Introduction

THE AIM OF THIS BOOK is to show how factional politics alter over time because changing resources become available to local protagonists through their own efforts or because other societal levels, resources, and networks affect the local arena. Factionalism was defined as the mobilization of ego-centred political action-sets. It was suggested that such actions are a strategy for engaging in political competition and a means through which resources and power may be allocated in particular socio-political and economic contexts. As a process, factionalism must be analysed from two perspectives. First, factionalism is the pattern generated by leadership strategies and political gamesmanship. Second, factionalism is a process related to general patterns of social change in both the local arena and the "wider context". The conclusions that follow deal first with the micro-patterns by using the historical periods as units for comparison. The second part situates the factional process, as one type of political competition, within a wider frame of socio-political and economic change.

The Patterning of Factional Processes

Stratification, Political Eligibility and Goals

For each historical period, a general model brought together the stratification pattern; the political eligibility of different population segments; the means by which the leadership mobilized support; and the network categories. By combining the patterns from all historical periods (Table 9.1), it is clear that fundamental structural transformation is absent; the general stratification pattern based on a separation between elites and mass has continued since the inception of the village in 1902. There are, however, five elements which have varied from one period to the next (Table 9.1): (a) the nature of the village elite; (b) the nature of political leadership; (c) the relationships between the village elite and the mass; (d) the relationships between the political leadership and the political elite/economic elite; and (e) the patterning of factional and team deployment.

(a) In Rajgahr history, there were three patterns of elitism. Initially the elite

Table 9.1: Stratification, Competitive Eligibility and Factional Category: A Summation

	Familial Elitism	Displacement	Class Elitism	Incorporation
1	Mass Political community Total network	Mass Political community Total network	Mass Political community Total network	Mass Political community Total network
(a)	Elite	Elite	Economic/political elite	Economic/political elite
2	Political elite Partial network Mill clients/ transactions/ kinship/friendship	Political elite Partial network Mill clients/ transactions/ kinship/friendship	Political elite Partial network Electoral support Action-Set #1 Factional support	Political elite Partial network (Electoral support) Other arenas
(c)				
(b)	Leader (miller) Action-set #1 Factional support	Leader (miller) Action-set #1 Factional support	Leader (economic elite) Action-set Factional support	Leader (economic elite) Action-set Factional support
3	Patron-client/ exchanges/kinship/ friendship	Patron-client/ exchanges/kinship/ friendship	Team Kinship/ friendship	Transaction/kinship friendship/history/ party/schism
(d)				
(e)	Action-set #2 Team	Action-set #2 Team	(action-set) Team	(action-set) Team
4				

was composed of family groups which controlled critical resources and maintained their position through the economic subordination of the village mass. Next came the second generation of the traditional elite. This group exploited an expanding economic base and a popular front ideology thereby creating diagonal segmentation. Such diagonalism, however, did not mobilize the bottom echelons of the village; rather, it involved upwardly mobile families who wanted the political and economic reorganization of the village. This is apparent from the numbers of families who remained with the losing miller after the fight; they were still indebted to him. By 1969, almost 30% of the villagers still sold to the mills, the least profitable mode of surplus disposal. This indicates that the fight did not eliminate indebtedness; rather, that the majority of villagers emerged from indebtedness is what caused the fight. The third type of elite group was a direct product of the post-Displacement economic and political expansion. A new occupational complexity became incorporated under an expanded stratification pattern: differential economic success had produced a larger elite group, a middle segment, limited in the extent to which future expansion could occur, and a lower class, totally alienated from major resources and dependent on others for access to land and jobs.

(b) These differences in the nature of the elite critically affected political leadership. To discuss this, the goals of competition must be considered. In all periods, these generally remained constant. Individuals within the elite segment organized and deployed political supporters to control economic and political resources which, not incidentally, always enhanced the political and economic position of the leadership. In the period of Familial Elitism, economic, political, and prestige goals were explicitly related to factional political strategies. Similarly, during Displacement, control of the political sphere was necessary in order to eliminate miller control and organize the economic expansion.

The period of Class Elitism does not exhibit the same clear-cut relationship between factional politics and economic goals except on the individual level. The various leaders were upwardly mobile, seeking the power and influence available through factional politics to consolidate and enhance their careers. The subsequent period of Incorporation, however, again explicitly linked political goals to the achievement of economic ends. With the mobilization of the elite by a national patronal system, local factional politics were used for economic mobility by both the leaders and the wealthy families.

Ultimately, it is during the period of Peace and its subsequent reorganization into factional politics that the association of economic with political goals can be seen. When resources were diffuse and economic competition minimized, the elite maintained its position without threat and adopted a paternal attitude towards villagers. When, however, economic resources became scarce and competition emerged, the political sphere once again became organized by factional politics.

The goals of factional competition have always been related, therefore, to a scarce

resource situation and to economic gain through political credibility and political control of power and influence. Furthermore, although rice millers, the second generation elite, and the new economic elite provided leadership, Rajgahr was always politically organized by the elite. Factionalism was a political process organized by elite segments or by upwardly mobile groups.

(c) Because of these commonalities throughout Rajgahr history, variations in factional politics therefore must derive from the nature of elite-mass interaction and the relationships between the political leadership and the political elite. The empirical evidence indicates that there have been alterations in mobilization tactics (Table 9.2). However, these clearly were constrained by the availability of particular categories of support. In turn, support categories depended on the bases for elitism during the period and on the economic allocation of resources. For example, the patron-client tie was critical during the period of Familial Elitism largely because of the way the village was stratified and resources allocated. The tie declined in importance and eventually disappeared as the economy altered over time. Similarly, first-order kinship declined as the bases for elitism altered. Additionally, transactional ties increased as opportunities for political involvement expanded for the local population associated with a decline in the extent to which leaders could define/control involvement. Further, as the factional process extended over time, mobilization by

Table 9.2: Mobilization Strategies: A Summation

Content	Familial Elitism		Period Displacement		Class Elitism		Incorporation	
	Ramprashad	Panchar	Ramprashad	Panchar	Prem Singh	Maraj	Prem Singh	Sultan
Patron-Client								
-familial			14.3%	14.3%				
First-Order Kin	7.1%	3.0%	14.3	14.3				
Patron-Client								
-Self	32.1	34.4						
Symmetrical								
Economic								
Exchange	14.3	12.5						
Second-Order								
Kinship	0.0	31.3			0.0%	6.3%	0.0%	4%
Friendship	32.1	3.0	42.9	42.9	27.8	0.0	16.7	0.0
Schisms	10.7	6.3	14.3	14.3	11.1	3.1	22.2	8.0
Transaction	3.7	9.4	14.3	14.3	22.2	15.6	22.2	24.0
Self-factional								
History					22.2	3.1	38.9	28.0
Religious								
Affiliation					0.0	6.3	0.0	8.0
Political								
Party					0.0	43.7	0.0	28.0
Familial-factional								
History					16.7	21.9		

schisms became more feasible and therefore was used more often either in terms of familial or individual involvement in factional politics. Finally, the introduction of nationalist political and religious movements added, in later years, new methods for mobilization.

(d) The ties between the political leadership, then, and the political elite vary according to several factors: the involvement of the wider society; village stratification; the categories of political involvement; and the ramifications of prior political conflict. Ultimately, however, these are dependent on elite-mass interaction; in other words, how the political elite were mobilized in the first instance. The three variations for mobilization from the mass were patron-client relationships, electoral support, or factionalism in other arenas. In addition, the leadership and economic elite had alternate avenues for interaction because their interests were often co-terminous. Economic exchanges during the miller period and friendship links in the majority of periods were additional means by which leaders mobilized support. In short, depending on the economic sphere and its associated relationships, the political elite was defined by leadership strategies. The resource structure, more specifically, the stratification pattern, was thus the critical variable in the interactive process—leader-political elite interaction depended on this pattern.

(e) The final variable from Table 9.1 is the patterning of factional and team deployment. Now we must consider the legal regulations since they interact with the stratification pattern to provide, in some cases, very precise constraints on leadership strategies. During the miller period with its particular economic structure, the leadership had almost total control of political mobilization. Buttressed by Ordinances which made the council an appointed body and by patron-client relationships which embraced most villagers, the leadership deployed two action-sets: the first set defined factional involvement from a partial network based on the patron-client tie; the second deployed a team for precise encounters in particular arenas, such as council competitions. During Displacement, the degree of control in this dual action-set strategy was altered: factional association was mobilized through electoral support (action-set #1) directly from the political community (total network). In the Class Elitism period, however, electoral support simply defined the political elite out of which the leadership mobilized/formed action-sets for factional support (action-set #1) and for particular encounters (action-set #2/team). However, during this period, the election suspension eliminated the link between the political elite and the factional set and, by the Incorporation period, the factional action-set became disassociated from particular competitions such as the village council and the concept of team became less important. These variations were influenced critically by legal regulations combined with the allocation of resources among the elite and the extent to which they controlled the mass.

Factional politics thus vary according to: (a) the nature of the village elite; (b) the nature of the political leadership; (c) the relationships between the village elite and the

village mass; (d) the relationships between the political leadership and the economic/political elite; and (e) the patterning of factional and team deployment. However, underlying this variation are two features: the nature of social and economic relationships at particular points in time and the way these are incorporated into the stratification pattern; and second, the nature of the legal parameters in which the local political arena is enmeshed.

Variations in Factional Games

Factional politics is a strategy used by elites for political and economic goals. On the one hand, insofar as any stratification pattern can be viewed at one point in time within a closed historical period, factionalism can be "gamelike", that is, "normative rules" appear to govern interaction and participants seem to agree on how to play politics.

On the other hand, each Rajgahr period incorporated the seeds of change. Although control mechanisms ostensibly kept intact a regularized pattern, factional politics and external inputs shuffled resources and prefigured alterations in the resource structure and factional "game". For example, during the miller period, the analysis of teams (action-set #2) indicated that both leaders were playing the same game; both were deploying support in the same way by using patron-client ties, friendship, and kinship, albeit with internal variations due to different support categories available to each leader. However, between 1937 and 1939, changes were occurring. Both leaders introduced closure but did so in a different way. Ramprashad became more "elitist"; Panchar became more "democratic"; the former circumscribed team access to those with symmetrical linkages while Panchar gave clients access. Eventually, the inheritors of the Panchar strategy furthered this democratization process and upset the miller game. Additional analysis of Panchar's action-set, however, indicted that elitism remained within his core despite the democratization of his team. This too was continued in his son's strategies since the diagonal segmentation of Displacement did not include the poorer sections of the village. Instead, it incorporated the upwardly mobile segment which had emerged from indebtedness and client status with the millers. In very specific ways the Displacement leadership strategies were apparent in prior tactics.

Subsequently, the politics of Displacement permitted the massive expansion which in turn made possible the politics of Peace. Eventually, the economic ramifications of these politics resulted in a closure of resources and a consolidation of the economic and political sphere by an expanded entrepreneurial elite group. The ensuing politics of Class Elitism led into the Incorporation period not simply because of national politics, but also because of the internal dissension produced by factional competition.

Finally, the beginnings of a diagonal segmentation process were apparent in the politics of Incorporation.

The reallocation of resources due to the factional process itself and the intrusion of external resources set the stage for subsequent periods. However, the politics of each period can also be interpreted as structural relationships at one point in time within an analytically closed system. From this point of view, the question becomes—what were the variations in factional politics if each period is viewed as its own 'game' with its own internal coherence and logic?

In Rajgahr history, three game patterns (Table 9.3) occurred: cumulative encounters, cyclical encounters, and the fight. Why are there differences? It has been hypothesized that cyclical games involve similar tactics (Bailey, 1969). This was the case during Familial Elitism and early Class Elitism. Conversely, during Displacement, strategies altered and a fight ensued. However, the cumulative pattern (Late Class Elitism) had common strategies while Incorporation, with a cyclical pattern, was a product of new strategies. Clearly, then, strategies alone are not the critical control mechanism; rather, strategies also must be predictable. For example, during Incorporation such predictability was present while during Displacement, not only were new strategies introduced, but leaders had different perceptions of arena organization. Yet, during the cumulative game, when both common definitions and similar tactics operated, the game escalated. Diffuse resource deployment, because of simultaneously operating arenas and elite collusion were additional controls in the cyclical games. Displacement, however, was waged in one arena and each leader could deploy maximum resources. In the cumulative game, competition moved successively from one arena to the other both temporally and structurally; at any time one arena was in operation. In addition, both periods had a political polarization which precluded elite collusion. Both the fight and the cumulative encounter game thus permitted maximum resource deployment because of arena organization and the unlikelihood of collusion.

The importance and dynamic of these two control mechanisms can be seen when the game patterning is associated with the allocation of resources among different village segments. During Familial Elitism, the pattern is cyclical, arenas are hierarchical and control mechanisms are related to costs of resource deployment, elite collusion, common perceptions of strategies. Simultaneously, there was a clear-cut division between the factional leadership/elite and the mass, with control maintained through indebtedness and patron-client ties. Additionally, the millers recognized the need for collusion against villagers. With the mass having few alternatives except miller support and the millers in turn aware of their common interests, a highly controlled factional game emerged in which no leader could achieve complete control although together, despite factionalism, total control was in fact the case.

Oscillating encounters also characterize Incorporation and the initial stages of Class Elitism. In both, the village elite was protected from mass mobilization because

Table 9.3: Variations in Factional Processes: A Summation

Historical Periods	Axes of Variation		
	Organization of Competitive Arenas	The Nature of Competition	Control Mechanisms
Familial Elitism	Hierarchy of arenas with minor arenas totalling the larger.	Oscillation between arenas; cyclical confrontations and encounters.	High costs of apical win; District Commissioner as mediator; factional alliances (collusion); agreement on "rules"; equal access to resources.
Displacement	Two conceptual definitions (private vs. public) of arena organization; one structural arena.	Fight	Failure: Altering of regularities governing eligibility, use of human resources and concept of conciliation; failure of traditional mediator; differential strategies.
Peace	Elimination of factionalism as political strategy.	Conciliation, arbitration. Competition based on individual conflict.	Diffuse resources; proliferation of alternatives, crosscutting interests; individualization of vested interests; elite collusion.
Class Elitism	(1) Breakdown, disorganization of conciliatory arenas. (2) Proliferation and overlap of arenas with each providing resources for others. Proliferation was occurring <i>simultaneously</i> . (3) Continued proliferation of arenas but with occurrence and resource provision being <i>lineally successive</i> .	Reorganization of factional arena. Oscillation between arenas with repetitive and cyclical confrontations and encounters. Cumulative encounters.	Failure: Scarce resources and new stratification pattern. Normative acceptance; wins/losses evenly distributed; equal access to resources; collusion; differential goal attainment. Partial failure: Lineality of encounters; failure of mediator; polarization of support despite normative acceptance.
Incorporation	Proliferation of wider/outside/higher level arenas as a result of arena fission and expansion.	Oscillating/cyclical confrontations and encounters.	Middleman protection; new arenas of competition; diffuse deployment of resources; new categories of support; new resources and new strategies; predictability; formal government hierarchy; national level policy.

of limited economic alternatives which the mass had. In the former period, resources were highly controlled by factional leaders themselves; in the latter period, the contraction of resources after expansion was followed by the new middle class consolidating its power position and hence maintaining control of political and economic resources. It seems that an entrenched elite which perceives its common interests

combined with limited economic opportunities for the mass produces a factional pattern of oscillating encounters.

However, the post-1960 period of Class Elitism, while it had the above features, was characterized by cumulative encounters. The factor of variation is the arena organization; encounters occurred in temporally successive arenas whereas the pre-1960 Class Elitism and Incorporation periods were characterized by simultaneous and proliferating arenas respectively. This indicates that when elites play factional politics, there must be some elasticity in the resource situation and in the perception of the competition. In brief, it cannot be structurally or perceptually a zero-sum game. In the later Class Elitism period, Sultan and his supporters continued to precipitate encounters stemming mainly from the overseer issue of 1960. With economic options remaining constant even for elites during this period because of the local economy and the lack of external stimuli during the years of national government transition from the PPP to the PNC, the extent to which factionalism could reallocate economic resources was minimal. Additionally, maintenance of political credit came to depend on fixed issues given few economic alterations. Economically and politically, the game was zero sum; lineally related arenas of competition were generated and the cumulative game emerged.

The period of Incorporation ended the cumulative pattern precisely because of new resources and the possibility that factional politics could be decisive in their allocation; arenas proliferated. Similarly, during Displacement, oscillating encounters ended because economic and political options expanded for the mass. It thus appears that the patterning of factional competitions is related to the availability of economic options for the population, associated with the arena organization which is a product of resources available to the elite. The resulting pattern is summarized in Table 9.4.

Table 9.4: Resource Availability and Factional Processes

		Economic options for the Mass	
		Available	Delimited
Economic options for the Elite	Available	Peace	Cyclical encounters
	Delimited	Fight	Cumulative encounters

Variation in Factional Sets

In the same way that factional processes can be bounded in time and analyzed, factional sets are structural products of leaders' strategies. In Chapter I it was noted that although such sets vary, this need not be an element in the definitional problem. Rather, internal variation only can be analyzed as a reflection of leadership strategies and in terms of the subsequent effects of these strategies on factionalism, that is, the activation of later sets.

The discussion of eligibility and mobilization patterns in this chapter has dealt with some of the constraints, legal regulations, and village organization which affected the level and manner in which such sets were deployed. Such constraints mean that data for morphological and interactional comparisons are uneven; some periods can be more extensively analyzed. Despite this, factional sets can be compared in terms of their implications for political strategies.

One possible starting point is the statement that "in the short run such groups may be structurally dissimilar" (Bujra, 1973: 135). In the present study, dissimilarity occurs not only between historical periods but also within the same period for different leaders. Dealing first with a comparison between periods, it is clear that morphological and interactional measures (Table 9.5) are intimately related to available resources. The transactional relationship, for example, as an index of durability, increases over time as a reflection of the growing complexity of village social organization as well as of its increasing integration into the national arena. During Familial Elitism, the link was seldom used. It was an unnecessary mobilization strategy since individuals already were bound through patron-client relationships; any transaction was either converted into this tie or simply not used by the leadership. This of course was related to the extensive control the millers exercised and to the stratification pattern which bound elite and mass in a particular way.

Table 9.5: Variations in Measures of Factional Sets

Period	Leader	Transactions		Mean Intensity		Multiplicity		Symmetry		Mean Linkages Per Person
		% of persons	Per Link	Per Person	% of Links	% of Persons	Mean Intensity	% of Links		
Familial Elitism	Ramprashad	4.8%	2.6	3.4	21.4%	35.0%	6.2	60.0%	1.3	
	Panchar	12.5	2.4	3.1	23.3	34.2	4.9	58.6	1.3	
Displacement	Ramprashad	16.6	2.4	2.8	14.3	16.6	3.0	85.7	1.2	
	Panchar	16.6	2.4	2.8	14.3	16.6	3.0	85.7	1.2	
Class Elitism	Prem Singh	33.3	2.3	3.5	27.7	41.6	5.2	100.0	1.5	
	Maraj	27.8	2.4	4.2	31.3	55.6	5.9	100.0	1.8	
Incorporation	Prem Singh	57.1	2.3	6.0	38.9	100.0	6.0	100.0	2.6	
	Sultan	85.7	2.4	8.4	28.0	100.0	8.4	100.0	3.6	

During Displacement, transactions increased moderately, but again, one leader continued traditional mobilization patterns while the other appealed to popular support with followers accepting future returns rather than immediate payoffs. During Class Elitism, however, the increased frequency of transactions reflects the availability of patronage resources from national politics and the vertical and horizontal complexity of the local arena in which demands for immediate returns had to be accommodated. Ultimately, in the last period, the proliferation of transactions reflects the scramble for resources and the extension of direct patronage from the national arena via the middleman factional leader. The fact that Sultan was the middleman and that he used this tie more than Prem Singh, indicates the close relationship between the availability of particular kinds of resources and the use of transactional support.

The intensity measures, when computed per link, exhibit little variation over time. On the other hand, when computed per person, there is great variation. This is a product of the election suspension and the development of multiple linkages between leaders and followers over time. Where mobilization strategies are constrained, the intensity measure vis-à-vis individuals is of limited use. Multiplicity, however, is itself not simply a product of delimited mobilization. Rather, its use during the miller period and its decline during Displacement indicate that it is a strategy related to the underlying social structure. During Displacement, immediate returns were not sought. Electoral and factional support were coterminous and by implication, multiplicity was absent. During the miller period, multiple linkages were preferred. This was due to elite control in which secure support could be sought and single links converted. Finally, multiplicity was a critical strategy of support maintenance during Class Elitism when elites had political choice and leaders tried to control personnel.

Factional sets thus vary in terms of intensity, transactional mobilization, and multiplicity. Variation in turn is related to constraints on leadership tactics due to resource allocation in the village and society. Additionally, however, variations characterize factional sets within periods. The view that evenly-matched teams provide a control mechanism (Bailey, 1969) and that competing groups are equivalent, must be examined.

During Familial Elitism, Panchar's strategies produced a set which had structural strength while Ramprashad emphasized interactional strength. The two sets were regarded as evenly matched through two different strategies. The resultant game pattern was in fact one of oscillating encounters. For particular confrontations, such as council elections, team structures were analyzed. In the 1937 election, Panchar's team was denser while Ramprashad's team had greater reachability. In structural terms, the teams were viewed as evenly matched. The interactional measures also indicated that the teams were complementary: Ramprashad had a more intense candidates' net; Panchar had a more intense total net. The 1937 election

resulted in an even split, and it can be argued that this was a product of the evenly matched, albeit differently structured, teams. For the 1939 elections, both teams had equal reachability while Ramprashad's team was more dense. Ramprashad's team was also uniformly more intense. In interactional and structural terms, Ramprashad had a stronger team. The 1939 election was a Ramprashad sweep although Ramprashad did not eliminate Panchar's support structure.

It appears there is a direct relationship among the following variables: factional structures, the result of particular encounters, and the general game patterning. Further, teams can be differently structured but equivalent. Additionally, teams can be unequal to the point whereby an encounter is won or lost yet their role as a control mechanism in the general game is not affected.

Such conclusions, however, rest on several assumptions. First, they assume that all network measures have the same implications. In this case, the supposition is that interactional and structural strength have the same effects. Even more specific is the assumption that various types of structural measures, density and reachability, are of equal weight and that different portions of the same network (the candidates' as opposed to the total net) have equal implications for the outcome of encounters.

The second major assumption is that factional patterning can be validly bounded; that each game constitutes a coherent and closed pattern. As will be recalled, Panchar's 1939 electoral team was structurally and interactionally "weak" because of his democratizing strategy while Ramprashad's strength was a product of an elitist strategy. However, both leaders' strategies were related to an altering resource structure. It is, therefore, difficult to deal with the miller game as totally, closed; both leaders' strategies were a response to change.

Finally, the suggestion that equal teams are a control mechanism is a post facto derivation from an equilibrium process. Because the process seems repetitive, the teams must be equal. Because the teams are equal and the process repetitive, the teams are a control mechanism.

The analytic problems are apparent from the data during Class Elitism and Displacement. In the former, factional structures were equally dense. However, Maraj's set was more durable while Premsingh's was of greater intensity. At the team level, Premsingh's set was more dense and he decreased the gap in upper zone mobilization. Although multiplicity was the same for both, Premsingh's multiple links were more intense. The conclusion reached was that the factional sets were matched while the teams were not. Cumulative encounters characterized the competition. Is this a more general pattern, or, is this simply the teleology of investigating the relationship between structures and game patterning? Briefly, the numerous variations and combinations which factional sets and teams can exhibit make it impossible, with the present data, to specify which measures and which structures are in fact equivalent.

During Displacement, two identical factional teams engaged in a fight. However,

the differing interpretations of how to mobilize the political elite were critical during this period. Further, during the rice miller game, teams were identical but there were alterations in competitive strategies for team deployment related to a leader's relationships with his factional support, relationships which in turn were a response to a changing resource structure. It is therefore suggested that the effect of factional sets on political process is not direct. This is logical given the assumption that sets do not engage in competition but are the structural results of competition. It is further suggested that factional sets, like the competitive process discussed previously, are better analyzed in terms of their relationship to the resource structure. The issues of structural equivalence and the role of sets as control mechanisms are secondary.

It has already been noted that factional sets vary in intensity, transactional mobilization, and multiplicity due to varying constraints on leadership tactics during different periods. Within periods, also, the relationship of resources to mobilization tactics can be examined. During Familial Elitism, Panchar used kinship relations and Ramprashad used friendship ties. These emphases limited Panchar's interactional strength because of the finite nature of kinship ties. In turn, Ramprashad's more diversified strategy constrained structural potential (density) but permitted the deployment of more intense links because of their relatively unlimited quantity. Factional sets reflect the resources available to leaders.

In addition, factional sets and mobilization patterns can be analyzed in terms of how they affect subsequent deployment. In all periods, subsequent action-sets (teams) depended on factional deployment in the same way that the latter depended on mobilization strategies from the political elite. This was due to the resources available to leaders by virtue of their own network involvement which in turn was related to general socioeconomic relationships during particular periods of village history.

The fact that factional sets are best analyzed in the wider context of elite-mass interaction and available resources is substantiated by investigation of lateral linkages within sets. This has been phrased as the issue of core support; it also raises the issue of the developmental cycle of factional sets over time. Table 9.6 associates factional types with historical periods, game patterning, and leadership. The major points of departure from the typology presented in Chapter I are twofold. First, the range of organizational types is far greater. Second, the original typology implicitly assumes a developmental process over time: factional sets are first mobilized through transactional means and become, eventually, more complex types. Mobilization, however, has been found to occur at different levels of village organization and as a product of diverse leader-follower linkages. This is similar to the analysis of multiple linkages in the previous section when it was found that multiplicity is not simply because additional links are added to a relationship over time; it occurs as well because particular environmental conditions make mobilization of multiple ties

Table 9.6: Factional Types, Periods and Game Patterns

Factional Types	Period	Leader	Game Pattern
1. Transactional ties between a leader and all followers:	—	—	—
2. Group of leaders each with own followers mobilized on a transactional basis:	—	—	—
3. Core support distinguishable:			
(a) Direct structure			
i. Quasi-group	Class Elitism	Prem Singh	Oscillating then cumulative encounters
	Incorporation	Prem Singh Sultan	Oscillating encounters
ii. Clique	Familial Elitism	Ramprashad Panchar	Oscillating encounters
(b) Indirect structure			
i. Secondary leadership	Class Elitism (1950's)	Maraj	Oscillating encounters
ii. Leadership alliance	Class Elitism (1960's)	Maraj with Sultan	Cumulative encounters
(c) Complex forms			
i. Two mutually exclusive cores/quasi-groups	Class Elitism (1960's)	Maraj and Sultan	Cumulative encounters
ii. Indirect structure plus two cores	Class Elitism (1960's)	Maraj	Cumulative encounters
iii. Combinations of the above types	—	—	—

a more useful tactic. Alternately, the deployment of symmetrical relationships is a product of both leadership decision and the presence or absence, in particular historical situations, of the asymmetrical link between leaders and potential supporters. Similarly, whenever the structure of a factional set is more complex than the minimal transactional action-set, it is not necessarily because initial structures have become more complex over time. Such may occur. On the other hand, complex structures may result because intense linkages were mobilized from the political elite precisely because this strategy was the more viable. Transactional and core support may be mobilized simultaneously.

Stated in more general terms, a developmental cycle of factional structures or the inevitable "institutionalization of 'factions' over time" cannot be assumed. The typology is simply a summation of various forms which have appeared in Rajgahr history with developmental relationships between types problematic. For example, it was not inevitable that Maraj's indirect secondary leadership pattern would evolve into a leadership alliance. More specifically, the different ways in which complex types emerge become apparent when morphological and interactional measures (Table 9.5) are associated with factional types. The direct clique structure (Familial

Elitism; both leaders) has the lowest proportion of transactional relationships; conversely, the direct quasi-group structure (Incorporation; both leaders) has the highest proportion. The remainder of the structures are intermediate. The clique is therefore not derived directly from the quasi-group. In fact, it can be argued that clique-structured sets have fewer low intensity transactions because the central core is so tightly aligned. Conversely, quasi-groups, mobilized via transactional relationships, are incorporating quantitatively what is not present in intense and dense linkages. This is substantiated by the intensity measures. Clique structures have the most intense linkages but the least intense leader-follower relationships. In contrast, quasi-group structures achieve high intensity by duplicating low intensity links. This creates strong leader-follower relationships but weak leader-linkage constellations. Similarly, the two types incorporate differently multiple ties: clique structured sets have the lowest proportion of all factional types. Despite similar densities, each type clearly is a product of different mobilization strategies rather than progressive development. Further, each has different implications for leadership costs. The clique structured set incorporates asymmetrical linkages; the other types do not. Given the low cost of maintaining asymmetrical ties, it is possible that their availability is critical for mobilizing clique-structured sets since low cost ties free resources for deploying the remainder of the set which is based on high cost linkages.

There is thus no inevitable developmental cycle or "stages of development" (Bujra, 1973: 133). Variations in factional sets are not simply a product of an internal dynamic which is inherent to a "group". Rather, variations are related to particular mobilization strategies which, in turn, are located within a particular resource structure. This latter relationship between sets and resources is again apparent when the relationship between factional types and game patterning is examined. For example, during early Class Elitism, a direct structured quasi-group and an indirect structure were associated with oscillating encounters. Are these, therefore, complementary structural types? Since there are numerous tactics by which factional sets can be mobilized so that different strategies may produce similar sets and vice versa, possible variations require further analyses before generalities can be made about complementary structures.

In any case, during Class Elitism, the crucial variable in the cumulative pattern was the perception of the game as zero sum and the associated use of lineal arenas. The intermediate variable between factional sets and factional patterning is the available resource structure. Except for tentative hypotheses, the relationship between factional processes and factional sets is better analyzed when both sets and processes are located within a common context of resource availability and elite-mass relationships.

The Rajgahr Political Process

The second view of factional process taken in this study is that factionalism is one type of political competition located within a broader pattern of socio-political change. "Factional processes are in a dialectical relationship with other social and political processes going on both within and outside the community being studied" (Bujra, 1973: 133). How can this process be conceptualized? The perspective most widely assumed is that factionalism is related to social change (Siegel and Beals, 1966; Nicholas, 1965; Bailey, 1969). When new resources become available or traditional norms are upset, a process of experimentation or dislocation manifests itself in factional conflict. Over time, new social alignments develop through generalization (fission or separation); resolution (solution of the issue or creation of a new power balance); or specialization (factional institutionalization) (Bujra, 1973).

Clearly, for Rajgahr, generalization is not applicable. Resolution, or the achievement of unity, is relevant to the period of Peace and to the attenuation of competition during processes of elite collusion. These are short-term, however, and they leave open the question of the macro-process over seventy years of Rajgahr history. Although unity may periodically emerge within the cycle, what of the cycle itself?

Institutionalization includes four variations: defeat of one faction and the winner's legitimation; factionalism, enmeshed in a one-party organization, becomes regarded as legitimate competition; factionalism, being indecisive, becomes ritualized and game-like; and factions transform into political parties (ibid., 1973). The notion of factionalism as legitimate competition is relevant to Rajgahr although the context is inapplicable. Second, a factional defeat was simply one stage (Displacement) in the village history. Finally, Rajgahr factionalism, although seemingly game-like, was different from Bisipara; variations in Rajgahr included a fight and cumulative encounters. Protagonists were not engaged in political ritual. Furthermore, the changing resource structure which underlay variable patterning precluded game-like processes.

In general, traditional developmental cycles leave open the issue as to the relationship of factionalism to general social process. It is therefore suggested that what happens to "factions" (specialization; resolution; institutionalization) is not the central issue. Rather, it is how factional politics are located, theoretically and empirically, in broader processes of change over time. Specifically, factional politics have received their impetus from the interaction of four factors. First, endogenous village processes became enmeshed in the factional process. Second, many endogenous processes caused interference from external arenas, both horizontal and vertical. Third, there have been external inputs unsolicited by the local sphere some of which have been ignored while others have been appropriated by local personnel. Finally, factional politics have been affected by previous factional processes themselves.

Examples of each factor are numerous. Endogenous processes refer generally to resource allocation because villagers took advantage of particular economic opportunities. Changing patterns of resource use, such as diversified cultivation or the cattle industry, and particular decision-making patterns, both economic and political, are examples of endogenous village processes. Some of these have precipitated inputs from outside as, for example, demands for drainage and irrigation services precipitated development loans; joint labour and machine exchange became a co-operative movement; and agitation over the Golden Grove boundary brought in government mediation. Unsolicited interferences included various legal ordinances, government policies and agencies, and national level organizations such as political parties and religious movements. In addition, most inputs were not simply imposed on villagers; rather, they were opportunities and changes to which villagers responded. Some responses were because of factional politics such as the use of the new electoral regulations; the villagers' initiative in altering village status to permit the regulations to be applied; and the incorporation of national parties and schisms into the local political idiom. Other inputs elicited responses not connected with factionalism as in the use of the co-operative ordinances, MARDS and the RPA. Finally, the factional process itself engendered change. The miller competition used resources in a way which became unacceptable to the villagers while factional Displacement ushered in an era of unprecedented economic expansion.

These four factors comprise the general dynamic of local process. Within these, operate the four variations in local politics: the nature of the village elite; the nature of political leadership; the relationships between village elite and mass; and the relationship between political leadership and political/economic elite. The critical elements underlying these, however, are the way social and economic relationships are incorporated into the stratification pattern as well as the legal parameters in which the local arena is enmeshed. The study also showed that factionalism is a strategy used by elites for economic goals: factional politics are always related to scarce resources and leadership is always derived from the elite.

Because of these underlying regularities, it is clear that the various historical periods are genetically related to each other. Leaders' action-sets during Familial Elitism responded to alterations in resource allocation. This early divergence was extrapolated by a later leadership, and mobilization of the unindebted, upwardly mobile villager continued into what has been defined as the subsequent period. Even the particular type of diagonalism characterizing Displacement was apparent in earlier leadership strategies: Panchar's core was still based on horizontal ties although access to prizes had become more diffuse. Also affecting strategies were the economic changes which began well before the stage altered. Ultimately, Displacement led directly into the economic expansion. It permitted capital accumulation and the reorganization of social relationships which led to the creation and seizure of economic opportunity. As this opportunity became limited over time, competitive

interaction increased. As scarcity continued, and as the new resource allocation differentiated between variable economic success, the elites reorganized factional politics, this time in association with a national political movement. This particular factional process eventually became a zero sum game as resources stabilized and returns diminished. New resources altered this trend and produced a diagonalism which is being worked out in the village today.


As previously noted, factional politics reallocates resources and as well, distributes new resources. It is an ongoing, dynamic that is not associated simply with social change. It is social change in the sense of contributing to and reacting within the ongoing process which characterizes any unit. It must therefore be reiterated that the concept of stages is artificial; there is simply an ongoing dynamic. The process for Rajgahr Village is summarized in Table 9.7. Cleavage patterns are associated with the accessibility and allocation of resources among village segments. This dynamic, combined with external inputs, alters elite construction, elite-mass relationships, political relationships, and leadership. Such alterations affect subsequent resource allocation and associated cleavages.

Comparative material on similar patterning is found in recent work by Attwood (1975; 1976) and Schryer (1975; 1976). Schryer describes for Hidalgo, Mexico, economic changes which produced a local economic depression, downward mobility, and dependence on external resources. Two trends emerged: class conflict on the one hand and individualized competition for resources on the other. PRI control then became decisive because its input of patronage resources co-opted individuals and increased individual competition, and thereby turned class conflict into factional politics and thus maintained the status quo.

Attwood describes a similar situation. A "conflict cycle" begins when an arena is controlled by a stable elite group. This is challenged by those who cannot satisfy their ambitions through individual contacts and who therefore act collectively. The result is "group mobilization" or a phase of class conflict. If successful, the out-group is admitted to decision-making roles in the arena. They bring with them new supports and a period of experimentation ensues in which individual opportunism and patronage relationships predominate (anarchic or pervasive factionalism). During this period, a leader or clique stabilizes the new and old power sources and the first phase begins again.

Both the Schryer and Attwood cycles fit aspects of the Rajgahr data. Schryer's Hidalgo case is similar to the economic depression during later years of miller control when diagonal cleavages opened new economic resources. When these became scarce and when party politics provided new patronage resources, the village was reorganized by factionalism. The Attwood cycle also fits the same period: individual demands and blocked access resulted in diagonal mobilization, the emergence of new opportunities, and the reorganization of factional politics within a stable, new elite group. The major difference at this point is that the reorganization of factional politics in

Table 9.7: Rajgahr Processes Over Time




Rajgahr in the early 1950's was not accompanied by experimental factionalism nor by an all-pervasive political party such as the PRI (Schryer). Further, there are differences in the Rajgahr pattern during and after Class Elitism. What happened was that factionalism, although controlled by a stable elite group, became cumulative because this elite found ambitions blocked by scarce resources. A period of group mobilization of elites occurred vis-à-vis the national arena and there followed extensive factionalism in which a segment of the elite gained access to resources in the national arena. In other words, a new kind of diagonalism was forming among some elites and the lower village echelons.

Therefore, after the reorganization of factionalism during Class Elitism, Attwood's model is applicable to some of the elite vis-à-vis the national arena, while the village out-group remains in that position until the present time. Simultaneously,


Schryer's model is applicable to the point at which the finite resources of Class Elitism created local economic pressure and the threat of downward mobility. Class conflict did not, however, emerge. Instead, national resources were introduced, individual competition emerged among elites, and the factional process continued with diagonalism at the grass roots level. Briefly put, both models, although relevant, do not account for the long-term process in which the local Rajgahr elite is being absorbed into the stratification pattern of Guyana in general.

It is therefore suggested (Table 9.8) that the ongoing processes must be combined with a more explicit presentation of the fact that different population segments have differential access to resources at the same time. As a result, cleavages are not simply horizontal, vertical or diagonal. Not only may several exist at the same time, but diagonalism itself varies according to the kinds of support within the lower echelons which are being mobilized. At the end of the rice miller period, it was the upwardly mobile entrepreneurs not the general mass. During Incorporation, part of the elite was mobilizing the general mass.

The flow chart is intended to be a hypothesis of political processes in local arenas. Each Rajgahr period can be found within. For example, the miller period is the following loop:



The apparent circular process is eventually altered by external inputs combined with gradual changes in resource allocation, access, and leadership which are often products of the factional process:



It is hypothesized that the majority of local-level processes can be subsumed within the model, or, that relevant additions or subdivisions can be made (Table 9.9).

It should finally be noted that the Rajgahr process is relatively closed. With the exception of external inputs, there is simply a continuous feedback between all variables. This reflects the Rajgahr dynamic in which structural transformation has not occurred; there has never been a major reallocation of resources. This is apparent from surplus disposal patterns and the observation made earlier that Displacement

Table 9.8: Flow Chart of Factional Processes




Table 9.9: Resource Availability, Cleavages and Game Patterns

	<i>Open to Elites</i>	<i>Closed to Elites</i>	<i>Open to some Elite</i>
<i>Open to Mass</i>	<i>Vertical and Horizontal Cleavages</i> Political peace Conciliation	<i>Middle range diagonalism</i> Factional politics Fight	?
	<i>Vertical Cleavage</i> Factional Politics Oscillating Encounters	<i>Vertical Cleavage</i> Factional Politics Cumulative Encounters	<i>Emergent Diagonalism</i> Class Conflict?
<i>Closed to Mass</i>			

did not end indebtedness. Specifically, methods of surplus disposal are still related to income (Appendix IX): 88.3 percent of those in the four lowest income brackets sell to millers while concomitantly, 92.7 percent of those in the lowest brackets have no surplus. Thus, low income remains associated with limited rice production and sale to millers. This condition persists because the millers still advance credit and families with a limited productive margin must guarantee access to credit should they require it. In turn, millers pay the lowest prices for padi. In a village of rich people and rice, historical inequities remain intact.

Postscript

SINCE I LEFT the field in late spring, 1970, a major change has occurred. A Report on Local Government, prepared in 1955 by A. H. Marshall, recommended that "the whole of the Coastlands, including unorganized areas and sugar estates should be parcelled out into not more than eighteen local authorities" (1955: 76). The implication was that local authorities be combined on the basis of geographical proximity in order to reduce the total number. Act No. 24 of 1969, The Municipal and District Councils Act, provided legal basis for the partial institution of the Marshall Plan.

On September 21, 1970, the Naarstigheids-Union District Council met for the first time in the Hopetown-Belair village office. The village districts comprising this new local authority are Golden Grove, Lovely Lass, Rajgahr, Armadale, Belair and Hopetown. In effect, the Rajgahr village council was abolished and local government was placed under the jurisdiction of this unified body. P. T. Preamsingh, Ebrahim Sultan and Hassan Rasool were interim appointments to the new council along with appointees from the other villages. Elections were anticipated shortly.

This change in the structure of local government is important because Rajgahr is surrounded by villages which are strong PNC support bases. In any election, whether national or local, the PNC has gained control of the local authority. Two questions arise: has the PNC passed over the old factional political system as the major means of gaining local support, or, has the expansion of the legal-political arena simply reinforced the previous factional process? Second, and related to this, what are the effects of legal incorporation on village cleavages?

Given prior patterns of village organization, there are several possibilities. If the wider arena is organized by factional competition, lower-class villagers may be further cut off from access to economic resources because of their increased distance from political power. In such a case, factional politics and diagonal mobilization may continue indefinitely provided sufficient resources filter down to quell discontent. If not, the diagonal cleavage may become horizontal. Alternatively, the legal change may have altered the factional process and the nature of cleavages so that vertical mobilization within the confines of a mass patronal party is another possibility.