

## CHAPTER EIGHT

# The Politics of Incorporation 1967-1970

## The National Arena

NATIONAL EVENTS which had been taking place from 1953 did not significantly affect the village until 1967. After the Constitution was suspended in 1953, an interim government was appointed until a new constitution could be readied and elections held. In 1955, the PPP split into two groups, one led by Cheddi Jagan, the other by L. F. S. Burnham. Another political party also emerged: the United Democratic Party (UDP), basically a reorganization of the former National Democratic Party, and designed to take advantage of the PPP split. In 1957 Burnham's PPP segment lost its major Indian supporters through death and resignation; Jagan's segment lost its major African following. Burnham renamed his group the People's National Congress (PNC) and in 1959 absorbed the African membership of the UDP. Two mass parties had emerged, each appealing to one of the major ethnic groups in the country (Despres, 1967: 5-7).

This association of ethnicity with party had increased during and after the 1957 elections. First, "apanjaht", or "vote for your own kind", became the watchword of the PPP. Second, after his election in 1957, Jagan made great efforts to win mass East Indian support despite internal cleavages with policies that appealed to Indian business interests, Indian professionals, sugar workers, and farmers. Conversely, "the 1960-1964 development programme almost completely ignored the pressing economic needs of the Afro-Guianese" (*ibid.*: 228-250). In turn, for the PNC to survive as a party, the "African vote" had to be mobilized, specifically for the 1961 elections. The association of party and ethnicity was almost complete (*ibid.*: 260). The final step was a product of the election campaign. "Practically every scheduled political meeting presented the risk of a racial riot.... By the time of the elections, relationships between East Indians and Africans had reached a boiling point." Jagan's party won the election but was soon "confronted with one serious political, crisis after another". In 1962, race riots broke out. The PNC and United Force Party (UF), formed in 1960, pressured the colonial government to introduce proportional representation, a crucial strategy since the PPP had never won fifty percent of the vote and had always been a minority government. By forming a coalition, the PNC and UF gained executive control after the 1964 elections were held under

this system. In 1966, Guyana became independent under the leadership of Burnham and D'Aguiar of the UF (*ibid.*: 263-266).<sup>1</sup>

With the PPP infiltration into Rajgahr in the early fifties and its association with local factional competition, it was predictable that when the initial split occurred in the PPP in 1955, local leadership would factionalize according to the national pattern. P. T. Preamsingh thus remained with Burnham, as did his family and core support.<sup>2</sup> However, as ethnic polarization began, more and more villagers transferred to the PPP. By the time of the 1962 riots, the Rajgahr population collectively supported Jagan's PPP.<sup>3</sup> Even families which had supported the NDP and the UDP also turned to "the Indian party". Only a few families turned to the United Force. One Rajgahr person, however, did change from the UDP to the PNC when the two merged in 1959 and remained with the PNC after polarization. This was P. T. Preamsingh—councillor, village chairman and factional leader.<sup>4</sup> With this one exception, Rajgahr was a PPP stronghold by 1962 with support reinforced by two factors. First, the race riots of 1962 and 1964 reached Berbice. A nearby African village was burned and minority groups in villages moved to where they would be with their "own kind". Several African families left Rajgahr in 1962 and the remainder left in 1964.<sup>5</sup> Second, PPP support was reinforced by Jagan's economic policies after 1957: Onverwagt land was rented to villagers; prices paid for padi and rice were kept high; and machinery fuel was allocated duty free.

Prior to 1967, village factionalism, as discussed in the last chapter, centred around local issues and competition was between a PPP leader and the older elite leader. Some of the latter's support had joined the NDP and UDP, but after the UDP united with the PNC and parties became associated with ethnic groups, the vast majority turned to the PPP. Village factionalism was therefore never focused around competing national political parties either before or after the PPP split; rather, the issue was the extent to which the PPP should control the village. When Preamsingh remained with Burnham's PNC, his followers supported national PPP politics while continuing to support him in opposition to the local PPP leader. His affiliation remained a personal matter although several attacks were made against him. In 1964, Preamsingh ran as an independent candidate in the Rice Producers' Association (RPA) elections against Sultan, Sayed, and Amin, all representing the PPP. The evening before the election, a bomb was thrown at his house but did no serious damage. Preamsingh lost and the PPP slate took the RPA positions.<sup>6</sup>

1 This description has been abstracted from L. Despres, 1967, *Cultural Pluralism and Nationalist Politics in British Guiana*. For a more detailed description, the reader is referred to this source.

2 Interview with Petamber Singh, November 1969 and P. T. Preamsingh, March 1970.

3 *Ibid.*

4 *Ibid.*

5 *Ibid.*

6 Interview with P. T. Preamsingh, March 1970.

This incident was the culmination of Preamsingh's public association with the PNC: he had run for a Legislative Council seat in 1961 as a PNC candidate against Sayed, the PPP candidate, and lost.<sup>7</sup>

Rajgahr was thus a PPP village.<sup>8</sup> With the exception of Preamsingh and the few families associated with the UF, villagers voted solidly PPP in regional and national elections while, in the local arena, factionalism was parochial in nature. Then, in 1967, changes on the national level combined with particular features of local politics to produce a major alteration in the local arena. The PNC began a policy to attract Indians into the party both to broaden their electoral base and to fission Indian communities so as to prevent further African-Indian disturbances. Mohamed Kassim, an Indian member of the Legislature for the PNC, was made a minister in the Burnham cabinet. He then formed a Muslim wing of the PNC dedicated to winning the support of Muslim Indians. The wing began building local parties in as many villages as it was possible to infiltrate.

Meanwhile, as has been noted, the local political process was escalating. The Sultan-Singh issue had led to the dispute between the Lall and Singh families and to the Panchar lawsuit against the local authority. The Sultan-Singh slander suit reached the courts in 1967. Singh's lawyer was a former cabinet minister in the PPP while it is alleged that Sultan personally asked Jagan for support in the case. Jagan apparently refused to intervene. Sultan lost the case and was ordered to pay Singh \$2500 in damages.<sup>9</sup> Sultan presumably blamed the PPP for the economic loss and the prestige setback. Soon after, Sultan was approached by the Muslim wing and became the PNC activist in Rajgahr.<sup>10</sup>

In this defection, Sultan brought his council and village supporters with him, a move made possible by the political polarization in the village. Further, the Indian wing of the PNC was designated as Muslim. Since Sultan was the priest of the Rajgahr Muslim community, most Muslim families defected with him. This too was an extension of local tensions, in this case, of those which had been developing between the various religious segments after 1953.

The final factor enabling PNC infiltration, later to be used by other Indian subsections, was the elaborate extension of patronage made possible largely because of political independence. The potential for PNC patronage was far greater than had ever existed for the PPP, and PNC patronage eased the scarce resource situation which had been apparent since the early fifties and therefore, it was eagerly sought by wealthy families. Land leases, civil service employment, and government jobs all allegedly became means of encouraging Indian support for the PNC. In addition, public works benefiting entire villages, were used to subvert support. In Rajgahr,

7 *Ibid.*

8 Interview with Petamber Singh, November 1969 and P. T. Preamsingh, March 1970.

9 Judgment presented by Francis Veira, Judge, June 28, 1967, in the case of Singh vs. Sultan.

10 Interview with Ameeraly, November 1969.

a one-mile portion of the middle dam was metalled to provide an all-weather thoroughfare. The money for many similar projects throughout the country was provided by USAID, but the PNC plan for distribution allegedly coincided with the extent to which a village had supported the party. "This was done to show the people where the money is."<sup>11</sup> The PNC infiltration exploited the political, economic, and religious cleavages in the village and, in doing so, was to alter the local level.

#### Arenas of Competition: The Council

During this period, as in all others, the village council was the centre of factional competition. Its character was similar to the previous period as were the specific issues forming the foci for competition. However, national party affiliations now became an integral part of council deliberations, that is, for the first time, the council became a microcosm of national level competition. Preamsingh's early attempts to prevent infiltration had failed. In addition, the 1961 suspension of local elections remained in effect and the strategies for subverting team members reached a new complexity.

In 1966, Sultan, to get council control, had mobilized Amin by giving him the chairmanship thereby gaining Mohamed's support as well. For the chairman elections for 1967, Amin hoped to retain the position and gave evidence at the Lall-Singh court case on behalf of the Lall family. However, because of the pressure resulting from the slander suit, Sultan's supporters decided that Sultan could better control Singh and should therefore be chairman. Preamsingh, in the minority position, had meanwhile subverted Deeroop by promising to support his bid for the chairmanship. The subsequent election ended in a draw since Amin, disillusioned with Sultan and given the deputy chairmanship by Preamsingh, also supported Preamsingh. According to the Ordinances, if a tie occurs, lots are drawn. Deeroop won the draw.<sup>12</sup>

The following year, the national PPP needed Deeroop's support to give the PPP the majority on council. They instructed Sultan, at a meeting, to give Deeroop the chairmanship. Sultan refused; Deeroop had defected once and besides, Sultan wanted to be chairman. Sultan won the chairmanship by once again mobilizing Amin's support.<sup>13</sup>

By the time of elections for 1969, the PNC Muslim wing had subverted Sultan, his factional supporters, and Amin. However, they had lost the support of Bharat who remained a staunch PPP adherent and who was expected to vote for Preamsingh

11 *Ibid.*

12 Interview with Dagleish, October 1969; Petamber Singh, November 1969; and P. T. Preamsingh, March 1970.

13 *Ibid.*

in the election. A tie result would see the chairmanship again depending on the drawing of lots. The Minister of Local Government called in Preamsingh for a discussion. The Minister informed him that since he was a PNC member, the party wanted him to vote for Sultan. Preamsingh refused. "I was the oldest PNC member in the village and I should be chairman", he said. A tie seemed inevitable. The evening before the election, however, Bharat was arrested by the Fort Wellington police and held in custody until noon the following day. Since the election was held in the morning, Sultan won by one vote.<sup>14</sup>

In 1970, the patronage of the PNC was allegedly used in an attempt to secure the requisite number of votes for Sultan's re-election. The metalling of the middle dam was begun and Deeroop was hired as a supervisor and his tractor was hired for transporting materials. After he was given an inspector's job for the Rice Marketing Board, Deeroop joined the PNC. The election seemed won. Defections then occurred from Sultan. Preamsingh offered Taharally the position of deputy if he voted for him as chairman. Already angry that he was receiving only five dollars a day on the road project as compared with the amounts Sultan, Brijlall, and Deeroop were receiving, Taharally gave his support to Preamsingh.<sup>15</sup> Simultaneously, conflicts in other arenas resulted in the defection of Amin. First, a land dispute arose between Amin and the Loknauth family, Sultan's supporters. Amin apparently ploughed and planted Loknauth's land. The council, controlled by Sultan, supported Loknauth's claim for damages.<sup>16</sup> Second, Amin, president of the Mosque, and Sultan quarrelled over building repairs.<sup>17</sup> Finally, some of Amin's cattle were impounded by the local authority's stray catchers. Amin assumed that Sultan had done this purposefully.<sup>18</sup> Amin voted for Preamsingh. His vote, plus Taharally's, gave the position to Preamsingh despite threats of sanctions from the PNC.

These shifting alliances point out features critical for understanding local politics. Firstly, the positions of chairman and deputy had become a major focus for competition. Although this had been true during all periods, the payoffs of these positions altered radically after 1967. By then, both national parties were trying "to extend party organizations to the local level. How else could government control the villages? If people were not attached to parties, the government would not be represented. Nothing would get done. Therefore, to be effective the PNC has to control the local councils".<sup>19</sup> The first step was to control the executive. The chairman and deputy positions were given "full PNC support" if they were sympathetic to the party. This meant two things. First, the PNC explicitly allotted the role of "middle-

14 *Ibid.*

15 *Ibid.* Interview with G. R. Taharally, December 1969.

16 Minutes of the Rajgahr Village District, May 1969.

17 Interview with Amin Mohamed, January 1970.

18 Interview with P. T. Preamsingh, March 1970.

19 Interview with Ameerally, November 1969.

man" to these persons; second, they gave their middlemen access to patronage sources, such as government jobs, to enable them to extend their influence among the local population. In Rajgahr, Sultan's goal of controlling the executive was a product of his goals as a factional leader and a political necessity if he were to survive as a major PNC figure on the local level. Preamsingh's motives were similar. Controlling the executive meant not only increased influence within the local arena, it also meant that the PNC might accept him as their major representative in the village.<sup>20</sup> The executive positions thus became critically important after the PNC infiltration. It was important for local leaders in their dealings both with each other and with the government. In turn, it was important for the government, given their strategy of local-level control. This focus from two societal levels created a middleman role sought by the political activists and thus intensified local competition.

It was equally important to have control of council because to have a PNC executive, there had to be a PNC council. Again national level policy heightened traditional competition. The intensified subversion strategies reflected both the inbred council and the competition for control. In turn, this enhanced the new importance of executive positions as mediating the national and local levels.

In other respects, however, competition within the council continued in the traditional manner despite the new circumstances. Specifically, although party alignments had begun after 1953, factionalism had retained its local definition. Maraj, by his opposition to a purely local leader who lacked support from a national party, was merely regarded by villagers as a local competitor. In the national arena, the village was united. It was with national polarization and the introduction of the PNC through Sultan that party politics, as competition between two organized national units, entered Rajgahr. The enmity between Sultan and Singh began to be viewed by villagers as a competition between two outside groups which had infiltrated the village. This perception was heightened when Lall's son sued Singh's son. Villagers had been supporting a factional leader; suddenly, they found themselves aligned with one or the other of two political parties. This new situation was complicated by Preamsingh's claim that he was a PNC member. The rumour generally believed in the village, however, was that Preamsingh had voted PPP in 1964 and was merely trying to jump on the PNC bandwagon because of the patronage. In any case, it was quite clear that Sultan was recognized as the PNC representative by the party and that Preamsingh was ignored. Further, Preamsingh's council support was generally believed to be PPP which reinforced the image of Preamsingh as a PPP man himself.

20 Despite Preamsingh's protestations as to his party membership, two factors seemed to alienate him from local PNC leadership. The first was the suspicion as to his loyalty given the rumours of his past history and the fact that his supporters were not PNC activists. The second was phrased by an informant who stated that "Preamsingh is not recognized by the party as being PNC. They see him as Rajgahr". Preamsingh's preference for British rule was unlikely to gain him support in a party which viewed itself as a nationalist movement.

The council was thus divided between the PNC and the PPP and this became the idiom through which traditional strategies and issues were expressed.

For example, in June 1967, Hassan Rasool complained to the District Commissioner that the overseer

behaved in a disorderly manner and threatened to murder me or anyone who should say anything against himself or his son... At the termination of the meeting, the overseer ordered councillors and proprietors out of the office saying 'get ah you rass out of this office for this is me office. ...' I would be glad if the Local Government Board could hold an inquiry into this matter.<sup>21</sup>

The District Commissioner felt, however, that an investigation was unwise since Sultan had been returned as chairman mainly to get at the overseer.<sup>22</sup> The incident was brought up at a later meeting. When it was found that it had never been recorded in the minutes, the issue was dropped.<sup>23</sup>

In the same month, Rasool reported to the District Commissioner that the council's attempts to waive rents owing from 1958 were in fact rents owed by such councillors as Dagleish, Mangar, and Deolall; by such administrative personnel as Singh, his sister, rangers Jagai Jamal and Modramootoo; and by the sons of councillor Amin.<sup>24</sup>

#### Other Arenas of Competition

Other village arenas, like the council, exhibited traditional features but with important variations and new processes. Traditional competition in the race club and the religious arenas reached a stalemate; however, these arenas fissioned into sub-arenas. In the case of the racing arena, two formal clubs continued, as in the previous period, to request permission to hold meetings at precisely the same time;<sup>25</sup> each was attempting to acquire legitimacy by having its application accepted. After Sultan defected to the PNC, he withdrew from the Mohamed race club. Since the Mohameds were Muslims already sympathetic to their priest as well as to their brother Hussein Amin, and since the Deeroop family, particularly Mahatma, were potential support, Sultan's withdrawal was an expedient strategy. Therefore, since neither leader wished to offend either family, the clubs were no longer used as a direct

21 Letter from Hassan Rasool to the District Commissioner, Fort Wellington, June 26, 1967.

22 Letter from the District Commissioner, Fort Wellington, to the Commissioner of Local Government, December 29, 1967.

23 Minutes of the Rajgahr Village District, February 26, 1968.

24 Letter from Hassan Rasool to the District Commissioner, Fort Wellington, February 19, 1968. Letter from the Commissioner of Local Government to the District Commissioner, Fort Wellington, May 23, 1968.

25 Interview with Amin Mohamed, December 1969 and Gopie Deeroop, December 1969.

political resource. However, the Mohamed club developed internal dissension and became in itself a competitive arena with ramifications on the general factional process.

Hussein Amin, president of the Mohamed club, maintained that an election was called by two of his brothers without his instructions. He insisted that this was because his brothers and their allies wanted his position as president. Other informants state that elections within the club should have been held annually. Amin apparently had been refusing to hold these for over three years. Finally, at a regular meeting, one of his brothers suggested that elections be held immediately. The membership agreed and one of Amin's brothers was elected president. Amin was nominated for the vice-presidency but refused the nomination as well as all others. He then withdrew from the club.<sup>26</sup>

Meanwhile, in the religious arena, a similar situation was occurring. The old division between Hindu and Muslim became a *fait accompli* after Sultan joined the Muslim wing. Since he took several wealthy Hindu and Christian families with him, the split was not schismatic. This division, however, was superseded by others within both the Muslim community and the Sanatan Hindu sub-section. In the former, a similar dynamic as in the race club was occurring. Apparently, Amin, the president, was refusing to call elections and members

can't move against he or there will be row. Only Sultan can do it, but he ill and no one else got the guts. Last August Sultan say to hold an election. Amin said the time not finish. Sultan write he a letter and then Amin sent he lawyer letter. So everyone frightened to go to court. They look bad in court. Amin going be president forever.<sup>27</sup>

This sentiment against Amin was a product of other tensions within the Muslim community. According to informants, Amin, in his capacity as president, had been constantly quarrelling with Sultan over leadership. Sultan at one point threatened to resign and for several days did not attend prayers. Then the issue arose of raising money for mosque repairs. Sultan initially berated the executive committee, of which Amin was chairman, for not carrying out the repairs. The committee maintained that no money was available and disagreement ensued over how it should be raised. One Friday after prayers, Sultan suggested that money be collected from the community. Amin accused Sultan of eye-pass and of attempting to take over his job. Simultaneously, Amin's cattle were impounded and land rented by Amin's sons was allocated to Loknauth ostensibly because the Amin family was ploughing the wrong land. As noted, Amin subsequently voted for Prensingh as chairman despite the PNC's request that he co-operate with Sultan.

26 Interview with Amin Mohamed, January 1971.

27 *Ibid.*

This fission within the Muslim community had a counterpart in the Sanatan Hindu community due to national political-religious movements. In the 1930's, the Sanatan Dharma Maha Sabha, a Georgetown organization, had been introduced into Rajgahr as a focus for Sanatan cultural revival. In the early fifties, the Gandhi Youth Organization was introduced into the country and a Rajgahr chapter formed in 1963. According to its local members, it too began cultural programmes, Hindi classes for children, and a major membership drive in 1966. At that point, Gandhi Youth activists left the Maha Sabha ostensibly because it was involved in national PPP politics. Informants also stated that the following year, the national Maha Sabha factionalized over whether to support the PNC or to remain wholly a cultural organization. While this was occurring, Georgetown Maha Sabha activists were visiting Rajgahr and accusing the Gandhi Youth chapter of taking over traditional Maha Sabha functions. Disagreement also occurred over the nature of temple ritual and Maha Sabha supporters began holding services in members' homes since the Pandit was a Gandhi Youth member. Finally, an informant stated that, in 1969, the Maha Sabha leadership in Georgetown committed itself to PNC support and therefore lost its Rajgahr chapter while Gandhi Youth "tries to remain divorced from politics".

A similar but slightly different chronology is available from local Maha Sabha supporters. They maintain that conflict did occur in 1967 over which organization would represent the Sanatan community and over the nature of ritual. This, however, was because Gandhi Youth were PNC supporters. Further, because of this political affiliation, their Georgetown leader was expelled from the Maha Sabha and in revenge he was now trying to destroy his old organization with his only success to date being the Rajgahr chapter. These informants insisted that the Maha Sabha does not mix in politics but remains a cultural organization.

This polarization is exemplified in a land dispute which emerged in 1968. The Maha Sabha applied for a section of common land on which to build a school. The village council approved<sup>28</sup> only to have the Commissioner of Lands and Mines insist that the area was Crown land and that permission had to be obtained from the Commission. Before the Maha Sabha could do this, the Gandhi Youth Organization applied to the Commission for the same piece of land. The issue remains: in reality, the land was allocated to the Maha Sabha by council but the government maintains that the Gandhi Youth made the first correct application. This ties into a long-standing dispute between the local authority and the government over control of village dams and common land. The government claims these are Crown lands; the village claims they are part of the original 1902 land grant. Because of these

28 Letter from Mahatma Deeroop, Chairman, Rajgahr Village, to the District Commissioner, Fort Wellington, December 19, 1967.

legal complications, the issue was never resolved.<sup>29</sup> In any case, the local Sanatan community remains deeply fissioned as a product of competition over religious jurisdiction in the national arena, a situation made more serious by competing national political parties which use the split as a resource.<sup>30</sup> This competition is now moving to the local level. For example, Sultan maintained neutrality throughout the land dispute although rumour stated that he supported the Gandhi Youth because they were PNC allies while interestingly, Petamber Singh was President of the Local Maha Sabha.

In general terms, arenas of competition emerged in what previously had been united fronts in opposition to similar units. There was a race club arena but competition within one of the clubs affected local factional competition. There was the long-term competition between the Hindu and Muslim communities, but within this arena, both groups were engaged in internal competition.

Concomitant with this fissioning process, new and larger competitive arenas were opening up with the result that village competition came to include more extensive geographical and political entities. All the village districts in West Berbice were represented in a Union of Local Authorities, an organization which met several times a year for chairmen and councillors to discuss common problems. Elections of officers were held annually. In 1969, Preamsingh was unanimously elected president of the Union; Gopaul of Woodley Park was unanimously elected treasurer after being nominated by Preamsingh and seconded by Mangar; and Petamber Singh was re-elected assistant secretary six votes to one after being nominated by Preamsingh. Ten persons were nominated for committee membership with six to be elected. Among the nominees relevant to the present discussion were Mahatma Deeroop who declined Nagassar's nomination; Amin who accepted Deeroop's nomination; three non-Rajgahr persons nominated by Preamsingh, one of whom declined; and Sultan nominated by Preamsingh. Amin was elected as were the two persons Preamsingh had nominated. Sultan received the lowest number of votes of all candidates. Preamsingh and his allies had immense influence in the West Berbice arena; Sultan had little recognition beyond the immediate village. Preamsingh nominated him in order to publicize this point.

Sultan subsequently attempted to use his PNC position to organize a following outside the village and to by-pass the Muslim wing and enter the upper echelons of the general PNC organization. He immediately came into conflict with Ameerally, the Woodley Park activist, over territorial claims; with the Muslim wing strategy of having activists located in villages to organize local participation; and with the general party policy of fragmenting the Indian segment by emphasizing the Muslim

29 Interview with Petamber Singh, November 1969; Joseph Bhagwandin, February 1970; and P. T. Preamsingh, March 1970.

30 *Ibid.*

section. At a Woodley Park PNC celebration in 1969, Sultan was not invited and Amin headed up the proceedings. Around the same time, Sultan presumably approached Kassim for a position on a government corporation. Kassim refused. Sultan then went to see Anjat Kamar, president of a construction company employing several Rajgahr labourers (Table II.8) and vice-president of the Muslim wing. He wanted an appointment with Burnham. At that meeting, the Prime Minister sent Sultan back to Kassim. Thus, Sultan was forced back into the Muslim wing and into Rajgahr.<sup>31</sup>

In the wider arena of West Berbice politics, Preamsingh's strategy of using traditional associations was more successful. The point to be made, however, is that political competition, resources, and credibility were located outside the village in wider arenas. The extent to which the political arena had expanded is apparent from the Prime Minister's visit to Rajgahr in September 1969. The persons invited to the dinner included all Rajgahr councillors, religious leaders, and school headmasters as well as the District Commissioner. Other guests were Sookool Deygoo, secretary of the Rajgahr Gandhi Youth; eight villagers who were Sultan's supporters, including Shiv Maraj (Dabi's brother), Sukhu Lall, Matthew Johns, Gaffur Gobin; and two of the wealthiest villagers whose allegiance remained problematic. Non-Rajgahr residents included nine representatives from villages on the west coast who were explicitly PNC supporters or activists and Fort Wellington personnel who were affiliated with the PNC. The guest list defines the larger arena as a major political fact of the period.

#### Resource Management and Social Networks

In this section, the issue of resource management is again discussed in terms of competitive eligibility; strategies of mobilization, maintenance, and deployment; and the subsequent composition of factional nets. Table 8.1 is a summary of the present period. As for the previous period, the stratification pattern is presented (Column B) with the village divided into cumulatively inclusive sections. The political community and the political elite (Column C) again correspond to the elite-mass configuration (Column B) with mobilization to the political elite ostensibly based, in legal terms, on electoral support. Most important, however, competition in other arenas provided means by which factional leaders mobilized and deployed support. The network definition (Column E) of the sectoral categories is again the same as in the previous period with the total net defined as the village mass and the partial net associated with the political elite as a product of electoral support and competition in other arenas. The factional set, the next level, is a product of action-set mobilization/

<sup>31</sup> Interview with Ameeraly, November 1969.

Table 8.1: Stratification, Competitive Eligibility, and Factional Category

(A) Constraint Level	(B) Stratification Pattern	(C) Levels of Political Eligibility	(D) Mobilization Criteria		(E) Network Definition	(F) Factional Category
			Economic Sphere	Social Sphere		
1	Mass	Political Community			Total Network	
2	Political Economic Elite	Political Elite	(Electoral Support)	Involvement in other arenas	Partial Network	
3	Leadership		Transaction	Friendship History Kinship Party/Ideology Schism	Action-set	Factional Support
4		Team			(Action-set)	

deployment by the leadership using varying linkages with the political elite. A second action-set, delimited as in the previous period by the suspension of elections, constituted teams which leaders deployed for particular confrontations such as the village council. These, however, were again based on leaders' subversion strategies rather than on direct mobilization from the factional level.

To understand fully the dynamic of resource management and, by implication, the categories of factional support as these related to the village social structure, there are three aspects of village and national organization which are critical. First, the Suspensions of Elections Bill, still in force between 1967 and 1970, had major implications. The linkages between the electorate and factional action-sets and between the electorate and council teams were eliminated.

Second, new factional arenas emerged in that religious arenas and a new race club arena fissioned out of pre-existing units. Simultaneously, wider gamesmanship became relevant. Such competitions influenced internal alignments on council and provided new means of mobilizing general factional support. Factional leaders could subvert personnel through schisms caused by these new competitions; factional leaders could maintain neutrality vis-à-vis the new arenas in order to maintain or enhance political credibility; or, factional leaders could become the focal point of these competitions and intimately mesh the traditional council arena with the new competitions. The proliferation of arenas thus became the major means of mobilizing, maintaining and deploying both council and factional support. Electoral linkages between the political community and factional politics were overridden.

Arena proliferation was in turn a product of the third major characteristic, "the politics of incorporation" (Silverman, 1976). This policy, together with other

national arena politicking, not only generated new factional arenas, it also halted the trend of the previous period toward "schismatic factionalism". Specifically, the incorporation policy attempted to integrate the local arena through several related strategies: the input of patronage resources; the control of formal local government organs; the creation of local activists/middlemen as intermediaries between the national and local arena; and the exploitation of pre-existing schisms for subverting local-level support, notably, religious, economic, and political divisions. Informants said that the only way to jobs was through the PNC and that the only access to the PNC was through the two activists, Sultan and Amin. With economic scarcity in all spheres, the PNC has placed itself in the position of patron in relation to the villager who in turn must promise support for the party. When Sultan joined the PNC in 1968, he was given access to resources which Prem Singh subsequently tried to obtain. The competition for these resources, as well as their use, added a new dimension to factional politics. Two leaders were no longer constrained by finite resources. This upset the stalemate and, hence, the spiralling, schismatic pattern. In addition, a new communication nexus between the national and local arenas not only by-passed the traditional governmental hierarchy but prevented direct contact between the local and national arenas. Expanded resources, new strategies, and the separation of arenas permitted the continuation of factional politics. In fact, the PNC encouraged such competition as a mode of generating support from the resulting schisms.

It must be noted that competitive goals also had been transformed. There were now two interrelated aims. First, there were the goals oriented to local politics. Leaders attempted to gain and retain the middleman role to obtain credibility and resources for local subversion. The middleman role meant success in local factional competition. Simultaneously, the successful local politician gained credit needed for mobility and recognition in the national arena. The payoffs were economic resources for personal use, such as land grants or government jobs. The national and local arenas thus interacted on the level of competitive goals. Within this process, however, the prize was the prerogative that went to the factional leaders. Allies could expect payoffs in the form of land grants, government jobs, etc., and support was mobilized by expectations as to which leader could produce the higher returns. As will be seen, the transactional relationship is a major leadership strategy. This raises the question as to how leadership strategies and the resultant factional sets related to this new resource structure.

The political elite, as in all periods after Familial Elitism, was a category in which membership was expressed through electoral choice. At the next categorical level (factional support), although leaders usually decided as to the competitors, the suspension of elections by now had circumscribed leadership decisions to the point that council data no longer represent factional mobilization and deployment patterns, but are simply indices of maintenance strategies.

With this limitation, council strategies were based on Friendship ties; Self-Factional History; Second-Order Kinship; Religious ties; Political Party affiliation; Transactions; and Schisms (Table 8.2). Immediately apparent is the inbred membership; every councillor is aligned partially because of Self-Factional histories thereby eliminating the Familial Factional tie of the previous period. Second, Sultan still emphasized political party membership which, with the exception of Bharat, remained intact despite his subversion to the PNC. Third, the number of transactional and schismatic links is higher than in any other period. Finally, the religious tie is not particularly prominent since the electorate had not decided on the proportion of Muslims. Therefore, the religious ties which Sultan might have activated are not necessarily represented.

Table 8.2: Mobilization Strategies<sup>a</sup>

	Self-Factional Friendship history	Second Order kin	Religion	Political Party Ideology	Trans- action	Schism
<i>Prem Singh's links with</i>						
Dagleish	×	×				
Chunilall Nagassar	×	×				
Jairam Mangar	×	×				
<sup>ab</sup> Hussein Amin		×			×	×
<sup>b</sup> Mahatma Deorooop		×			×	×
<sup>c</sup> Drepaul Bharat		×			×	×
<sup>c</sup> C. R. Taharally		×			×	×
Total	3	7	—	—	4	4
<i>Sultan's links with</i>						
Pritam Brijlall		×		×	×	
Isaac Jaikarran		×		×	×	
<sup>b</sup> G. R. Taharally		×		×	×	
<sup>b</sup> Drepaul Bharat		×		×	×	
<sup>c</sup> Mahatma Deorooop		×		×	×	×
<sup>bc</sup> Hussein Amin		×	×	×	×	×
Hassan Rasool		×	×	×		
Total	—	7	1	2	7	2

*Note*

<sup>a</sup> In the period under discussion, the content of a relationship may have altered over time. In such cases, all criteria which were relevant are noted.

<sup>b</sup> Indicates that the person, at some point, defected from the leader to the other.

<sup>c</sup> Indicates that the person, at some point, was mobilized by the leader from the other.

In cases of subversion, the person is included in both lists.

Within these above trends, there are only minor differences in leadership strategies (Table 8.3). First, the friendship and political party linkages, as in the last

Table 8.3: Mobilization Strategies: Percentages

Content Type	% of total links		% of total persons	
	Prem Singh	Sultan	Prem Singh	Sultan
1. Friendship	16.7	0.0	42.8	0.0
2. Self-factional history	38.9	28.0	100.0	100.0
3. Second-order kinship	0.0	4.0	0.0	14.3
4. Religious ties	0.0	8.0	0.0	28.6
5. Political party affiliation	0.0	28.0	0.0	100.0
6. Transaction	22.2	24.0	57.1	85.7
7. Schism	22.2	8.0	57.1	28.6

historical period, are the major variations between the two leaders. Secondly, both leaders predictably emphasize an individual's factional history, although the schism is better exploited by Prem Singh. Finally, both leaders use transactional links in a similar fashion. In general terms, beyond the base of friendship and political party used differentially, both leaders maintained council support in a similar way.

In applying the intensity scale as derived from the previous period,<sup>32</sup> this similarity is also apparent. Prem Singh's average intensity per person is 6.0; Sultan's is 8.4. These very high levels clearly are due to multiple links being forged with constant personnel over time. However, when the measure is applied to linkages, the intensities are relatively low: Prem Singh's is 2.3; Sultan's is 2.4. In short, where multiple links are caused by external factors, intensity based on linkages rather than persons must be used. Further, the use of low intensity links points to the emphasis on transactions and schisms as critical strategies, a factor also brought out by subversions (Table 8.4). Of the four persons subverted, two realigned more than once. Second, each leader subverted two persons. Sultan subverted Amin and Deeroop. Both had Self-Factional History/Transaction/Schism (Type A) linkages to Prem Singh and Sultan merely added one or two extra links. In the case of Deeroop, this was the political party tie; with Amin, the religious as well as the political party tie was added. Insofar, however, as a major portion of the political party tie consisted of a transactional exchange, Deeroop's and Amin's subversions were basically founded on the transaction. In addition, their propensity to realign several times further supports this fact. Further, although Amin added the religious tie to his new linkages with Sultan, the situational material indicates that this was a rationalization rather than a cause. In turn, Prem Singh subverted two Type B constellations replacing them with Type A's. In other words, the schism superseded the political party tie.

In general, subversion was based on individual goal-oriented motives premised on a calculation of gain. Further, the constant council membership and the absence

32 The friendship tie was weighted as three; Self-factional history as three; Second-order kinship as three; Political party as three; Religious tie as two; Schism as two; and Transaction as one.

of mobilization from the political elite almost totally defined leadership strategies. Simultaneously, the transactional emphasis indicates that the election suspension permitted council followers to maximize their own gains without fear of recrimination from the electorate.

Table 8.4: Subversion Strategies

Person	Subverted Links	New Links
Hussein Amin (mobilized by Sultan)	A. —Self factional history —Transaction —Schism	A <sub>1</sub> —Self factional history —Transaction —Schism —Religion —Political Party
Mahatma Deeroop (mobilized by Sultan)	A. —Self factional history —Transaction —Schism	A <sub>2</sub> —Self factional history —Transaction —Schism —Political Party
Drepaul Bharat (mobilized by Prem Singh)	B. —Self factional history —Transaction —Political Party	A. —Self factional history —Transaction —Schism
C. R. Taharally (mobilized by Prem Singh)	B. —Self factional history —Transaction —Political Party	A. —Self factional history —Transaction —Schism

Methodologically, the nature of council politics precludes the application of measures used for previous periods. Lateral linkages would necessarily be skewed while morphological (density, zones) and intensity measures would be artificial. All that can be said is that leaders' strategies exhibited similarities with an unprecedented emphasis on transactional relationships; factional strategies in council were almost totally a product of external conditions. An extrapolation, therefore, is that the critical leadership strategies can be found elsewhere. What was the structure of the wider factional political sphere?

PNC incorporation policies obliged middlemen to perform two functions: control local government organs and subvert mass support. The politics of the former function have been discussed; the latter meant that villagers had to be induced to vote for the PNC in national and regional elections;<sup>33</sup> to generally support PNC policies; and to refrain from any other political involvements. Incorporation policies thus placed a new emphasis on leadership linkages to the political community and

33 A check on voting was made possible by "proxy voting". Those who wished to make their vote known, gave activists, during elections, their vote. Thus, for example, in the 1968 election, Sultan and Ameerally collected approximately 300 votes in Rajgahr.



political elite. Factional strategies therefore aimed to mobilize and deploy support from the political community at large. This was a process similar to that of the rice miller period. However, the arena structure was different. In the miller period, arenas were hierarchically organized; in the present period these arenas were the product of fissions in traditional arenas, a process caused in the first instance by the incorporation policy and nationalist machinations. Both Sultan and Preamsingh had to control the political community; they did this by exploiting and inciting competition in other arenas.

Specifically, the two leaders exploited economic and religious schisms which were the basis of PNC infiltration and the arena fissioning process. By 1969, factional leadership alignment was definitely associated with income and religion. As Tables 8.5 and 8.6 indicate, the PNC was successfully subverting the Muslim section of the Indian population—the policy aims of incorporation were working. Second, despite Petamber Singh's pre-eminence in the Sanatan community, Preamsingh, with whom Singh was so intimately aligned, does not have the massive Sanatan support that would be predictable. Similarly, Preamsingh's support from the Christian community is limited. In the case of the Sanatan support, Singh was president of the local Maha Sabha chapter during the fission with the Gandhi Youth Organization. This contributed to Sultan's support among the Sanatans. This is substantiated by the extensive Aryan support which Preamsingh commanded. Aryans, uninvolved in the Sanatan split, supported Preamsingh. In addition, the Christian support which Preamsingh should have mobilized as a Christian minister was undermined by the

Table 8.5: Religious Affiliation and Leadership Alignment

Leader	Religious Affiliation				
	Sanatan	Aryan	Muslim	Christian	
Sultan	30.4	7.5	41.9	28.2	--
	50.7	4.5	26.9	16.4	100%
Preamsingh	27.7	32.5	18.6	35.9	--
	46.9	19.8	12.1	21.2	100%
Sultan-Preamsingh*	29.4	32.5	27.9	17.9	--
	50.7	20.0	18.5	10.8	100%
Neutral	12.5	27.5	11.6	17.9	--
	36.8	28.9	13.4	18.4	100%
	100%	100%	100%	100%	--
	--	--	--	--	--

\* The category of Sultan-Preamsingh connotes persons who were stated by informants as "turning either way" depending on which leader appeared to be gaining the upper hand at any given time.

Table 8.6: Income Distribution and Factional Alignments

Income Group	Sultan	Factional Alignment		
		Preamsingh	Sultan-Preamsingh	Neutral
\$ 0—1500	28.3%	42.4%	41.5%	42.3%
\$1501—3000	35.8	37.8	44.6	42.1
\$3001—6000	25.2	13.7	10.8	7.8
\$6001+	10.4	6.1	3.1	5.2

village's factional history and the economic aspects of incorporation. Since the vast majority of Christians were part of the extended Maraj-Panchar-Loknauth-Bhagwandin family, Preamsingh's ability to mobilize religious ties was limited. This constraint was serious since these were also the wealthier families. As Table 8.6 shows, economic diagonalism was simultaneously emerging: factional alignments follow stratification cleavages with Sultan's support in a higher income group than Preamsingh's. This is related to the strategies of wealthier families who realize that PNC support is where the higher returns lie. In turn, such families are of more interest to the PNC: the party and its middlemen are expending more effort and resources in their mobilization than with the lower income villagers. The latter can only exchange their vote and the cost is minimal; the former have economic and political power that in some cases transcends village boundaries.<sup>34</sup> It should be noted that by exploiting economic differentiation in this way, the PNC should contribute to further diagonalization in the future.

The fact that the village councillors themselves exhibit the same diagonal pattern is relevant here. Table 8.7 summarizes villagers' and councillors' incomes; Table 8.8

Table 8.7: Village Income Distribution and Councillors' Incomes and Occupations

Income range	% of Village Cumulative		Councillor	Income	Occupation
	Households	%			
\$ - 900	20.1	20.1	—		
\$ 901-1500	23.4	43.5	Dagleish	\$ 1000	Rice; pension
\$1501-2000	18.6	62.1	Brijlall	\$ 2000	Rice
\$2001-3000	15.8	77.9	Bharat	\$ 2100	Bookkeeper
\$3001-4000	8.3	86.2	Jaikarran	\$ 3000	Rice; wage
			Nagassar	\$ 3100	Rice
			Preamsingh	\$ 3200	Rice; J.P.
\$4001-6000	6.1	92.3	Taharally	\$ 3300	Rice; shop
			Deorooop	\$ 5688	Rice; wage
\$6001+	7.2	99.5	Mangar	\$ 6300	Rice; cattle
			Amin	\$10000	Rice; cattle
			Rasool	\$11000	Bus owner
			Sultan	\$12300	Rice; cattle

34 Interview with Ameerally, November 1969.

Table 8.8: Net Worth of Leaders' Support

<i>Prem Singh's support</i>		<i>Sultan's support</i>	
Dagleish	\$ 1,000	Brijlall	\$ 2,000
Nagassar	\$ 3,100	Jaikarran	\$ 3,000
Prem Singh	\$ 3,200	Deeroop	\$ 5,688
Taharally	\$ 3,300	Amin	\$10,000
Mangar	\$ 6,300	Rasool	\$11,000
		Sultan	\$12,300
<i>Net worth:</i>	\$16,900		\$43,988

computes the "net worth" of each leader's council support. It is clear that the PNC strategy is contributing not simply to diagonalism among the general population, but that the village leadership, as represented by the councillors, is also being mobilized in a way that creates a diagonal cleavage.

The village thus appears to segment along the lines emphasized by the incorporation policy. Religious affiliation, competition in other arenas, the historical dimensions of factionalism, and economic class groupings provide the structural lines of local village and factional organization. The more general pattern, however, is a diagonal division which increasingly emphasizes stratification and crosscuts prior vertical cleavage lines such as religion. The extent to which a horizontal cleavage emerges as the critical structural principle depends on future policy as well as the response of the local arena.

#### Core Support and Followers

With the suspension of elections, leaders' cores cannot be assumed to derive from council mobilization patterns as in previous periods. Further, the new strategy of political community mobilization means that core support will not be concentrated in council deployments, but will be found in the general population. For example, Sultan's major support comes from several families whose participation has been noted throughout this chapter. Prem Singh clearly has a council core consisting of Nagassar and Mangar although outside the council, the Singh family as well as many lower income families could be mobilized and deployed for critical confrontations. Quantification of cores during this period is therefore not possible even though the qualitative material suggests that these existed.

#### The Patterning of Factional Processes

The introduction of a particular kind of party politics constrained the trend, visible in the previous chapter, toward schismatic factionalism. Specifically, patronage resources for local-level subversion/mobilization to the national PNC were siphoned through designated middlemen who had traditional factional leadership roles. Leaders thus received a new kind of pragmatic legitimacy for their traditional political roles while simultaneously, these roles were buttressed by new competitive resources. Second, this reinforcement of traditional competition was associated with the selective filtering of new resources. Resources were not simply introduced; they were introduced through the traditional factional process. The immediate effect of incorporation reinforced traditional political alignments and strategies. This, in turn, produced a redefinition of leadership goals. Leaders still competed for support; however, this now gave the credibility needed to maintain or gain the middleman role. Maintenance of that role in turn provided resources for successful local subversion/mobilization. Leadership goals were now defined with reference to the interaction between the national and local arena.

Simultaneously, national politics and the incorporation policy changed the arena structure of schismatic politics. From arenas organized lineally within the village, arenas expanded to "outside" and higher-level entities while simultaneously, traditional arenas fissioned. The competition between Sultan and Amin, partially because the PNC recognized both as legitimate middlemen, forced competition in the race club and religious arenas as both middlemen attempted to control these secondary arenas for popular support and political credibility. A similar pattern is apparent in the Sanatan split, a product of national political competition over Indian commitment to the PNC. Incorporation, by opening new arenas through expansion or fission, provided new resources and strategies which constrained schismatic tendencies.

It was important, however, that the designation of Sultan as middleman did not provide him with a disproportion of resources which might have enabled him to eliminate Prem Singh. Rather, Prem Singh had political credibility in alternate external arenas and was in any case vying for the middleman role. The expansion of arenas and common goals allowed Prem Singh to remain a viable competitor. It was important, too, that the arena fissioning produced new divisions which were not coterminous with the traditional support categories factional leaders had used. Sultan could mobilize Sanatan and Christian support from Prem Singh; the Muslim Mosque arena created neutrals and cut into Sultan's support; and finally, the exploitation of stratification divisions created new categories of potential supporters for both leaders.

In general, incorporation designated traditional factional competitors as middlemen while altering their competitive goals and arena structure. In turn, continuing

factional politics altered categories of competitive eligibility. National infiltration altered escalation and factional politics continued with a new idiom.

Logically, of course, many traditional features remained. The council arena retained its typical character because the election suspension isolated it from the effects of the incorporation policy. Despite new support categories, strategies, and resources, the constant membership gave rise to the typical pattern of cyclical confrontations. Within it, however, the complexity of subversions were shaped by Sultan and Preamsingh competing for control and hence the middleman position. At this point, the effects of incorporation became critical: Sultan's PNC resources were insufficient for total subversion since arena fissioning placed certain councillors in new support categories which Preamsingh could exploit. For example, both Mangar and Nagassar as well as Singh were Maha Sabha supporters; PNC support of the Gandhi Youth reinforced the Preamsingh's council position. In addition, Taharally's subversion indicates how party patronage could backfire. Those who felt they weren't aptly rewarded could be mobilized by the other leader.

At one level, incorporation was a control mechanism: it ended the schismatic trend and reinforced factional politics. Since the new resources created new arenas and support categories, Preamsingh could still compete. Further, arena proliferation meant resources had to be diffusely spread. Thus, the PNC policy of encouraging local activism, which was really the use of factionalism as the means of mobilizing support, was the critical control mechanism.

The factional politics during the period can, therefore, be seen as a controlled pattern of oscillating and cyclical encounters. However, similar to the Displacement period, a process of "diagonal segmentation" is very apparent: the wealthy are being mobilized into the PNC and this pattern crosscuts vertical divisions, such as religion. This pattern is also reflected in local support structures: Preamsingh's support derives mainly from the poorer segments of both the mass and traditional elite. The larger political pattern is therefore one of diagonalism, and with scarce resources increasingly accessible only to the economic elite, there is a process which in future is likely to result in the further differentiation of classes as the rich become richer and the poor remain poor.