

CHAPTER FOUR

The Era of Familial Elitism 1927-1942

Introduction

IN 1927, AN INCIDENT OCCURRED which typified the era. Gangadeen alleged he had been assaulted by Jurany. The case was taken before the Panchayat, the customary means for settling disputes. Members said that assault was an indictable offence not under the Panchayat's jurisdiction. The issue was taken to the Magistrate's court. It is said that just prior to the hearing, Ramprashad spoke with the Magistrate on Jurany's behalf and that when Gangadeen came to the courthouse, he was told that "the case finish". The Panchayat had been unable to handle a case which a rice miller had been able to "fix". The Panchayat received no more cases; it had become abundantly clear to villagers that the millers provided the best "services".

This chapter investigates the implications of this incident. By the late 1920's Rajgahr had an elite composed of two milling families, both dependent on the same resources: a finite number of villagers and their padi. Entrenched as an elite by virtue of local economic conditions, Panchar and Ramprashad could freely compete with each other for access to the resources controlled by the other. Vertical mobilization of villagers and factional competition became the critical political features of this period in Rajgahr history.

Goals of Competition

The millers' competition centred around particular goals and generated specific arenas. First, each leader tried to control the village council by having his supporters in the majority. This gave the leader authority for making local administrative decisions while the council's legal functions (land allocation; collection of rates and rents; etc.), if differentially applied, could be translated into political and economic influence. Second, both millers competed for the major share of local padi. This meant that the majority of cultivators, always in need of credit, were continuously indebted to one of the millers. The resultant patron-client relationship became the dominant mode of controlling villagers. At that point, the millers' political and economic goals were mutually reinforcing: economic hegemony was defended through the legal decision-making process while council control was made possible by the economic subordination of the villager. The villager, forced into a client

status with one of the millers, became a major resource in the factional competition by providing both padi and political support for his patron.¹

The millers' exclusive access to council control was further maintained by the fact that the Local Government Board appointed councillors and in so doing necessarily favoured local notables. The Maraj, Panchar, and Ramprashad family members were obvious appointments. All were Christian, literate in English, and successful businessmen. Further, these appointees, by virtue of being chairmen, recommended persons to fill the additional seats while the District Commissioner, whose opinions were also solicited, also used the recommendations of the chairmen.

Three additional factors reinforced the millers' council control. First, the relocation of a large proportion of villagers to the Abary Creek area removed many from effective day-to-day involvement in local affairs. Others, who maintained the dual occupational strategy, were absent from the village for extended periods working on estates. Second, opposition to the millers was precluded by economic dependency; political support was an integral part of the creditor-debtor relationship. Third, even the few villagers who were not indebted had a vested interest in miller control. The payoffs for their support—for example, a council seat or a joint economic venture with one of the millers—could only enhance their personal economic position. Until they constituted a group large enough to challenge the miller hegemony, these villagers used the structure for their individual benefit.

Two secondary goals complemented the village council as an object of competition and as an economic resource. First, prestige maintenance is a traditional Indian value which is expressed through the "mati" or "eye-pass" dispute which erupts when an individual feels that another has ignored or insulted his position by assuming himself to be superior (Jayawardena, 1963). Prestige maintenance became a logical goal in the elite competition both as an end in itself and as a means of establishing political credit in the competition for clients, padi and council control.

Second, the formal governmental hierarchy (cf.: Chapter 2) made the village council the legal intermediary between the population and the colonial government: council control implied a middleman role. This enabled the millers to selectively allocate any resources from the central government and to control communications from the population or other factional leader to higher officials. Resources could be aligned before complaints or information filtered up the hierarchy.

¹ Interview with Petamber Singh, November, 1969 and with Dagleish, January, 1970.

Arenas of Competition

The millers' goals involved several foci, but all were interdependent; absolute control over the village was the ultimate aim of each miller. Every gain was perceived as a step in this direction. The following description of leadership strategies illustrates the political regularities of the period. I begin first with the village council, a major competitive arena.

One of the first major incidents, in the early thirties, was the loss by Maraj of the support of some relatives in the Jaikarran line (cf.: Appendix VII). This support was astutely mobilized by Ramprashad for the council competition in which two strategies predominated: obtaining as many appointees as possible and/or subverting existing appointees.

Easter Jaikarran and his brother-in-law Jagdial quarrelled over land allotments in Armadale. The will of "Old Man" Jaikarran had divided the first depth of Armadale into seven equal portions, one for each of his children. Easter was not only dissatisfied with one-seventh of the total, but wanted a section of the second depth which was leased to his brother Ramdharry by his sister, Jagdial's wife. Easter induced her to sell him the first depth and immediately pressured Ramdharry to give up his second-depth lease since the land ordinances gave the first depth owner the right to subsequent depths. Ramdharry, however, was using this land for a major economic venture with A. B. Ramprashad. Ramdharry provided the land and labour while Ramprashad provided the capital with the profits from the sale of rice evenly split. When Easter began to agitate for the second depth, the following alliances came into play:

- 1) Jagdial + Ramdharry *vs.* Easter Jaikarran;
- 2) Ramprashad + Ramdharry *vs.* Easter Jaikarran; and therefore
- 3) Ramprashad + Jagdial *vs.* Easter Jaikarran.²

Jagdial's defection in 1931 gave Ramprashad a majority on council which he retained until 1935 (Table 4.1) because his brother John, who had moved to Rajgahr, had been appointed as had Ramdharry. Simultaneously, the retirement of Panday and Wailloo eroded Maraj's support despite Panchar's appointment in 1933. Panchar's only supporter was Jaigobin Singh, a member of the Jaikarran line.

In 1935, however, Local Government Board action reversed the situation. None of Ramprashad's supporters were reappointed, although Ramprashad had with him P. T. Premsingh who had arrived in Rajgahr in 1925 and had formed a cricket club of which Ramprashad became manager. Panchar meanwhile had taken over

² Interview with A. B. Ramprashad, November, 1969.

Table 4.1: Factional Deployment on Council,³ 1930-1935

Year	Ramprashad Supporters	Maraj-Panchar Supporters	Neutrals
1930	A. B. Ramprashad Naipaul	Panday Wailloo Jaigobin Singh Jagdial	Morrison*
1931	A. B. Ramprashad Naipaul Jagdial	Panday Jaigobin Singh	Morrison Parmeshwar
1932	A. B. Ramprashad John Ramprashad Ramdharry Jagdial	Jaigobin Singh	Morrison Parmeshwar
1933	A. B. Ramprashad John Ramprashad Ramdharry Jagdial	Jaigobin Singh Jacob Panchar	Parmeshwar
1934	(same as 1933)		
1935	A. B. Ramprashad P. T. Premsingh	Jacob Panchar Darshanand Bhagwandin Seeram Ranhit Imdad Usman	

* Morrison was the district medical officer who left West Berbice in 1932 thus leaving a seat vacant. His official position explains his neutrality.

the leadership of the Maraj hegemony⁴ and found the council filled with supporters. First, Darshanand's nephew Parmeshwar had been neutral during his sojourn on council;⁵ Darshanand merely supported the stronger leader. Second, Imdad Usman's father, Yamin, had been the village overseer during 1927; he had received Maraj's support and was also a client of the Panchar mill. Usman supported Maraj-Panchar.⁶ Third, both Bhagwandin, who had married Panchar's wife's sister, and Seeram Ramhit, who was a Panchar mill client, supported Panchar.⁷

³ Minutes of the Council Meetings of Rajgahr Country District, 1930-1935.

⁴ Interview with Dagleish, January, 1970.

⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶ Interview with Petamber Singh, October, 1969.

⁷ *Ibid.*

After 1935, major changes were made in the suffrage laws, in the legal status of Rajgahr, and in the formal constitution of the council. Specifically, enfranchisement for local government elections no longer excluded those who were not literate in English and the suffrage was extended to all Village Districts. In 1936, Rajgahr's legal status was changed to Village District. In addition, the number of councillors for Village Districts was increased to nine with only one-third appointed by the Board. Finally, the chairman was no longer appointed but was to be elected from among the councillors.⁸

Although significant in their possibilities, these changes did not immediately affect factional competition since they in no way altered local socio-political organization which was based on the patron-client tie between elite leader and villager. In fact, the changes merely reinforced this structure by providing a new method by which political support for patrons could be expressed. The villager, with his vote, remained subordinated.

Since the first elections were not until November 1937, the Local Government Board appointed two additional members so that the council would conform to the new Ordinance.⁹ Table 4.2 gives the council composition in 1935; in January 1937 before the first election; in 1937 after this election; and in 1939 after the second election.

It is worth noting that the 1937 council is somewhat different from 1935. Firstly, Dagleish had been appointed. He supported Ramprashad because of his friendship with Preamsingh and his dislike for Maraj whose supporter, Easter Jaikarran, had years before foreclosed on his father-in-law's mill. Dagleish also strengthened Ramprashad's linkage to Jurany whose marriage to Dagleish's wife's sister reinforced debt for Ramprashad's intervention in his assault case. In contrast, Dindayalsingh's support for Ramprashad was another example of Maraj's and Panchar's inability to control their extended family: although Dindayalsingh's sister was married to Panday, a former councillor and Maraj's brother, he gave his support and padi to

⁸ Ordinance #16 of 1935.

⁹ Letter from the Acting Overseer, Rajgahr Village, to District Commissioner, New Amsterdam, December 16, 1937.

Table 4.2: Distribution of Council Support and Electoral "Slates"

Key: * indicates persons on the factional "slate"

(E) indicates elected to council

(A) indicates appointed to council by Local Government Board

	1935 ¹⁰ Councillors	1937 ¹¹ Councillors	1937 ¹² Electoral Slate and Councillors	1939 ¹³ Electoral Slate and Councillors
<i>Ramprashad Supporters</i>				
A. B. Ramprashad	(A)	(A)	(A)	(A)
P. T. Preamsingh	(A)	(A)	*(E)	*(E)
J. Ramprashad			*(E)	
Jurany		(A)	*	
Dagleish		(A)	*(E)	*(E)
Dindayalsingh		(A)	*	
Jaigobin Singh			*	
E. Ramprashad				*(E)
Rajaram Dabi				*(E)
Hussein Amin				*(E)
*Morrison			(A)	
Chandkairran				*
<i>Maraj-Panchar Supporters</i>				
J. Panchar	(A)	(A)	*(E)	*(E)
Darshanand	(A)		*	*
Bhagwandin	(A)	(A)	*(E)	*
Seeram Ramhit	(A)		*(E)	*
Imdad Usman	(A)			*
Loknauth			*	*
*Morrison		(A)		
Johnson		(A)	(A)	
N. I. Dookhun				*
Bandoo				*
Alladin				*
<i>Neutral</i>				
Dr. De Freitas				(A)
Parmeshwar				(A)

* Morrison appears twice: once as a Panchar supporter, the next time as a Ramprashad supporter

¹⁰ Abstracted from Minutes of the Council Meetings of Rajgahr Country District, 1935.

¹¹ Minutes of the Rajgahr Village Council, 1937.

¹² Interview with Petamber Singh, November, 1969 and Letter from District Commissioner, New Amsterdam, to the Local Government Board, November 16, 1937.

¹³ Letter from the District Commissioner, New Amsterdam, to the Commissioner of Labour and Local Government, November 20, 1939.

Ramprashad.¹⁴ In contradistinction, Panchar's supporters really had been reduced to two: Panchar himself and his brother-in-law Bhagwandin. The support of Morrison and Johnson was not dependable; there were no ties through which to mobilize them. Morrison was District Medical Officer and Johnson was of African descent from Belair.

For the chairmanship election¹⁵ in January 1937, Panchar nominated Morrison. Panchar knew that he himself could not win but that he might take some votes from Ramprashad, and that Morrison, if elected, would need Panchar's support for the council to function.¹⁶ This manoeuvre was offset by the absolute control over votes held by Ramprashad.

That September, however, Johnson, and another of Ramprashad's brothers, Ernest, quarrelled. A. B. Ramprashad refused to take sides since he and Johnson were fellow churchmembers. He resigned the chairmanship and withdrew from active participation on the council.¹⁷ Panchar nominated Johnson as interim chairman. With A. B. and another Ramprashad supporter absent, Johnson won.¹⁸ Panchar gained a supporter through the same manoeuvre attempted previously with Morrison. Johnson subsequently encountered racial discrimination and was ineffective as chairman.¹⁹ Panchar, however, now had some leverage within the council for use as political credit in the November elections.

At that time, factional leaders aligned their support as "parties". In this way, even though votes were cast for individuals, every voter could be clearly informed as to the leadership affiliation of each candidate²⁰ (Table 4.2) while concomitantly, the leaders maintained exclusive control of the competition. It should be noted that A. B. Ramprashad did not run for election, and in fact never did so. He considered it beneath his dignity and was an appointed member throughout his career: his Georgetown connections always assured him of a seat.²¹ In addition the only new supporter Ramprashad deployed was Jaigobin Singh, another defector from Maraj and Panchar, for reasons similar to those of Ramdharry and Jagdial, that is, the

14 Interview with Dagleish, March, 1970.

15 Minutes of the Rajgahr Village Council, Elections for 1937, December, 1936.

16 Interview with P. T. Preamsingh, November, 1969.

17 Interview with A. B. Ramprashad, March, 1970.

18 Minutes of the Rajgahr Village District, September, 1937.

19 Letter from District Commissioner, New Amsterdam, to Secretary, Local Government Board, November 5, 1937.

20 Interview with Petamber Singh, November, 1969.

21 Interview with A. B. Ramprashad, March, 1970. During his career, Ramprashad served on many national committees, for example, the Local Government Board and the Local Board of Guardians. In later years, he was the President of the West Berbice Union of Local Authorities; President of the Rice Producers' Association; Vice-President of the Rice Marketing Board; a Member of the Transport and Harbours Board; a Director of the Rice Development Company; and a Director of the British Guiana Credit Corporation.

support which Maraj and Panchar gave Easter Jaikarran.²² Finally, the only new Maraj-Panchar supporter was Loknauth, married to another of Panchar's wife's sisters.

The election gave each leader the same number of seats.²³ The three appointments became decisive.²⁴ Johnson was by now a Maraj-Panchar supporter given their previous transaction. Morrison, who had returned to the district, was now Ramprashad's friend: both had served together on the Local Government Board.²⁵ Finally, with his own appointment, Ramprashad held the majority. He then decided to remove himself from his conspicuous position and designated Preamsingh to carry on.²⁶ The latter was elected chairman for 1938 and again for 1939.²⁷

In that year, elections were again held, and leaders again organized their supporters as "parties".²⁸ This support was generally the same, although several new persons were deployed (Table 4.2). Ramprashad deployed Chandkairan, a long-standing client at Ramprashad's mill; Amin, a good friend of Preamsingh's and son of a mill client; and Rajaram Dabi, Preamsingh's friend but also close kin to the Panchar-Maraj family in that his sister had married Jacob Panchar's brother. His support was to prove tenuous.²⁹ In turn, Panchar deployed four new supporters: Usman had been on the 1935 council as a Panchar supporter; Dookhun had been village overseer with Ramprashad's support, but had defected to Panchar; Bandoo had married Jacob Panchar's niece; and finally, Alladin Azam was a client of the Panchar mill through the help of which he was rapidly becoming a wealthy man.³⁰

The election shut out Panchar's supporters although Panchar was elected.³¹ The appointed members³² did not alter the division. The council was totally controlled by Ramprashad, with Preamsingh as chairman, for the next two years.

In November 1940, De Freitas, an appointed member, resigned his seat.³³ A shop-keeper named Harbaran, a Panchar supporter, was appointed.³⁴ In the chairmanship elections for 1941, Panchar had also subverted his relative Rajaram Dabi and Par-

22 Interview with A. B. Ramprashad, February, 1970.

23 Report of the Returning Officer for Rajgahr Village Elections, November 26, 1937.

24 Letter from the District Commissioner, New Amsterdam, to the Secretary of the Local Government Board, November 29, 1937.

25 Interview with A. B. Ramprashad, March, 1970.

26 *Ibid.*

27 Minutes of the Rajgahr Village Council, December, 1937 and December, 1938.

28 Interview with Dagleish, January, 1970.

29 Interview with Petamber Singh, November, 1969.

30 *Ibid.*

31 Report of T. Thompson, Returning Officer for Rajgahr Village Elections, November 28, 1939.

32 Letter from the Acting District Commissioner, New Amsterdam, to the Chairman, Rajgahr Village District, December 13, 1939.

33 Letter from the District Commissioner to the Commissioner of Labour and Local Government, November 7, 1940.

34 Letter from the Commissioner of Labour and Local Government to the District Commissioner, New Amsterdam, November 13, 1940.

meshwar. Panchar ran against John Ramprashad. Since A. B. Ramprashad was ill, Panchar expected a tie which would have required a general election for the post. However, Harbaran did not attend the meeting and Ramprashad won by one vote.³⁵ Panchar later alleged that Harbaran did not attend because the clock in the village office had been pushed ahead twenty minutes so that Harbaran would miss the election. Both Panchar³⁶ and Harbaran³⁷ demanded an inquiry as did several Panchar supporters outside the council.³⁸ However, Gainlall, the village overseer and a Ramprashad supporter, maintained that he had checked the office clock against his watch and found it correct. The District Commissioner, in his report to the Commissioner of Local Government, stated:

time is of so little importance and is taken so little notice of in such a community as Rajgahr, that unless special precaution is taken, the clock is likely to be inaccurate. I doubt if an inquiry will serve any useful purpose as my experience in Rajgahr is that it is extremely difficult to arrive at the truth when holding an inquiry there.³⁹

Thus far, the village council has been presented as the major arena generated by the goals and strategies of the leaders. At the same time, the millers also were competing for clients, padi, prestige and control of the administrative staff. As an example, we have this account by A. B. Ramprashad:

Bhola came to me with his pregnant wife and a bailiff who had just levied on their house and contents because Jacob Panchar's father-in-law, Maraj, had loaned them money and gotten judgement on them. They came to me for help. Bhola said he would pay me when the crop came in, so I paid the whole amount to the bailiff and their property was released. He became my client. At the end of the year, he couldn't pay off his entire debt so he continued with me as was the usual custom. He gave me a pronote for all the borrowed money, but he became so delinquent in his payments that I had to put him in court. He told the magistrate that I had made him sign the pronote—that I had held his hand and made him sign. It was true that I had held his hand to help him sign but that was because to write his name was all he knew. The pronote had been witnessed by the Headmaster of the Hopetown Congregational School who was a friend of mine. We sent for him and he told the magistrate that the week before the court case, Bhola had come to his house with a bunch of plantains and asked him to appear for him in court in relation to the pronote. But the Headmaster threw him out of the house.⁴⁰

35 Letter from P. Gainlall, Overseer, Rajgahr Village, to the District Commissioner, New Amsterdam, December 16, 1940.

36 Minute from J. Panchar to the District Commissioner, New Amsterdam, undated.

37 Letter from Harbaran to the District Commissioner, New Amsterdam, December 16, 1940.

38 Petition from Abdul Ebrahim and eleven others to the Chairman of the Local Government Board, December 17, 1940.

39 Letter from the District Commissioner, New Amsterdam, to the Commissioner of Labour and Local Government, December 21, 1940.

40 Interview with A. B. Ramprashad, March, 1970.

In addition to providing credit facilities, the millers performed other types of services for their clients, services often required in the first instance, because of factional competition. For example, John Mohamed complained to the District Commissioner that his father had owned several houselots in the village until his death in 1933 and that these continued to be appraised as his property until 1939 when they were suddenly put up for sale as part of the estate of another villager who had died intestate.⁴¹ Jacob Panchar took up his client's case. He accompanied the Mohameds to the village office for the investigation⁴² and wrote the District Commissioner that "a matter of this nature should not go by. Anyone can be made to suffer at the hands of unscrupulous men".⁴³ The implication was that the village overseer, a Ramprashad supporter, had altered the assessment book.

The competition for prestige was also of crucial importance as was the ability to manipulate the communication hierarchy. In 1935, A. B. Ramprashad decided that the village name should be changed to "Rampur". He received the support of the council, or that part of it which supported him, and applied to the District Commissioner to transmit the suggestion to the appropriate authorities.⁴⁴ The District Commissioner delayed his reply and communicated his opposition to the Local Government Board.⁴⁵ Because of the confusion which would be created in the redrawing of maps, the reissuing of titles, etc., the Local Government Board refused the change.⁴⁶ Ramprashad then appealed to the Governor, through the Colonial Secretary, stating that the Governor had publicly supported the notion in 1936 and was now "acquiescing".⁴⁷ The Colonial Secretary tersely replied to Ramprashad that once the feasibility of the suggestion was found to be limited, the Governor could not give his consent.⁴⁸

Many of the confrontations, unlike this one, had serious repercussions. The most critical was an altercation between Preamsingh and the Maraj family. While Johnson was chairman of the village in the latter part of 1937, he rented Maraj the middle dam and common land north of the village to hold a horse race meeting on January 1, 1938, the day on which Preamsingh was to take over as chairman. Villagers objected to the low rent charged and to the permission given to erect barriers on the dam and charge an entrance fee. The morning of the races, the new council met and

41 Letter from John Mohamed to the District Commissioner, New Amsterdam, June 7, 1939.

42 Interview with Dagleish, January, 1970.

43 Letter from J. Panchar to the District Commissioner, New Amsterdam, May 16, 1939.

44 Letter from N. I. Dookhun, Overseer, Rajgahr Village, to the District Commissioner, New Amsterdam, August 21, 1936.

45 Letter from the District Commissioner, New Amsterdam, to A. B. Ramprashad, Rajgahr Village, January 9, 1937.

46 Letter from the District Commissioner, New Amsterdam, to the Chairman, Rajgahr Village District, February 10, 1937 and March 8, 1937.

47 Letter from A. B. Ramprashad to the Colonial Secretary, Georgetown, March 15, 1937.

48 Letter from the Colonial Secretary, Georgetown, to A. B. Ramprashad, March 31, 1937.

decided to remove the barriers since permission had not been obtained from the Local Government Board. Preamsingh went to the dam with police protection and tore down the barriers. The following day two of his pigs were shot, and within one month, his twenty-four cattle died from starvation (their tongues had been slit). Preamsingh pressed charges against Manraj's nephew, Bala, and asked for damages. Manraj Maraj then ordered Preamsingh to vacate his house which was located on the village office lot owned by Maraj. Maraj then sued the village council for their interference on the grounds that he had received permission for the races from the previous council. The council alleged that such permission was invalid without the approval of the Local Government Board. The council won the case. Preamsingh never again raised livestock and he developed an antipathy towards the Maraj family which has survived until the present time.⁴⁹

The extent to which villagers actively took part in the competition between the millers is apparent from the following, as is the way in which leaders attempted to build public credibility. In August 1940, P. T. Preamsingh resigned as village chairman to accept a job at Atkinson, East Bank Demerara.⁵⁰ In the election for his unexpired term, Panchar was nominated by A. B. Ramprashad and seconded by John Ramprashad; there were no other nominations and Panchar was acclaimed chairman.⁵¹ As A. B. Ramprashad expected, Panchar's position was untenable.⁵² That was the point in electing him. For example, several proprietors asked permission to cut the eastern dam to facilitate drainage. Instead, Panchar ordered the overseer to drain the water by clearing the channel. The same day, the overseer went on holiday and the dam was cut by four men, one of whom was Jurany.⁵³ At a special council meeting five days later, councillors John Ramprashad, Preamsingh and Dagleish stated that they gave the order to cut.⁵⁴ Two days later, Panchar ordered the dam repaired. This was never done.⁵⁵

The final arena generated was a product of competition to control the administrative staff. P. Gainlall was appointed overseer by a Ramprashad-controlled council in 1933. In 1935, the Panchar-controlled council lowered his salary and forced his resignation.⁵⁶ Two applicants for the job received the council's attention, Dass and N. I. Dookhun. Panchar supported the Dass application; Ramprashad supported Dookhun because J. Luckhoo, of a renowned Georgetown family, had informed

49 Interview with P. T. Preamsingh, November, 1969.

50 *Ibid.* Preamsingh was employed by the United States government in the construction of an airfield.

51 Letter from P. Gainlall, Overseer, Rajgahr Village, to the District Commissioner, New Amsterdam, August 7, 1940.

52 Letter from J. Panchar to the District Commissioner, New Amsterdam, November 4, 1940.

53 Letter from J. Panchar to the District Commissioner, New Amsterdam, December 26, 1940.

54 Minutes of the Meeting of Rajgahr Village Council, December 30, 1940.

55 Letter from J. Panchar to the District Commissioner, New Amsterdam, December 31, 1940.

56 Interview with P. T. Preamsingh, October, 1969.

Preamsingh that he would like to see Dookhun, a distant relative, appointed. Ramprashad's supporters, then a majority, appointed Dookhun.⁵⁷

In late 1937, after Ramprashad's resignation from the chairmanship and Johnson's election, a strained relationship developed between Johnson and the overseer. Dookhun complained that it was almost impossible to carry out district work under Johnson. As an example, he stated that a trench-cleaning job had been given to Gangadeen when other applicants would have charged less.⁵⁸ On the other hand, Johnson complained that the overseer refused to take orders and was opposed to him because he was "Negro born".⁵⁹ Johnson stated that the overseer accused him of having Gangadeen do the work at that price, "because he wanted a drawback. And when I informed him of his villainness, he told me to follow him outside and he will make me swallow my teeth".⁶⁰

At a meeting on November 3, the council prepared a list of charges against the overseer. At the end of the meeting, Johnson instructed the overseer to hand him the village office key. Dookhun refused, stating that he had not been dismissed or suspended. The chairman then grabbed Dookhun's walking stick and said he could not leave until the key was handed over. As Johnson and Bhagwandin held him, Dookhun pretended to throw the key out the window. Johnson and the others ran outside with a lamp to look for it, and Johnson ordered Bhagwandin, a constable, to arrest Dookhun. This he did, but after a time, let him go.⁶¹ The next day, Dookhun handed in his resignation to take effect from November 30th. The council, however, "refused to accept the resignation, preferring to have him dismissed".⁶² Dyal Matadin was then appointed acting overseer.⁶³ In February 1938, with Ramprashad again in control, the chairman informed the District Commissioner that the council could find no trace of legal notice terminating overseer Dookhun's appointment. The chairman explained that the minutes indicated a suspension on account of presumed irregularities which were never proven; the original suspension was therefore invalid.⁶⁴ A. B. Ramprashad then moved that the acting overseer, Dyal Matadin, be dismissed and that Dookhun be reinstated and paid until the appointment of a new overseer.⁶⁵ This drew official protests from Panchar, Bhagwandin, and Seeram Ramhit. They

57 *Ibid.*

58 Letter from N. I. Dookhun to the District Commissioner, New Amsterdam, October 31, 1937.

59 Letter from F. Johnson, to the District Commissioner, New Amsterdam, October 28, 1937.

60 Letter from F. Johnson to the District Commissioner, November 11, 1937.

61 Letter from N. I. Dookhun to the District Commissioner, New Amsterdam, November 3, 1937.

62 Letter from the District Commissioner, New Amsterdam, to the Secretary, Local Government Board, Georgetown, December 17, 1937.

63 Letter from the District Commissioner, New Amsterdam, to the Secretary, Local Government Board, November 5, 1937.

64 Letter from P. T. Preamsingh, Chairman, to the District Commissioner, New Amsterdam, February 8, 1938.

65 Letter from J. Panchar, T. Bhagwandin and Seeram Ramhit to the Local Government Board, February 9, 1938.

maintained that the Board had approved of the original dismissal and demanded that Dyal Matadin be reappointed to act until a new overseer was appointed.⁶⁶

At a special council meeting the District Commissioner insisted that he could not ask the Board to approve the appointment of an overseer who had just been dismissed. It was then decided that there would be no overseer until a new appointment was made, but that Dookhun's dismissal would be effective from March 31st and that he would be paid until that time.⁶⁷

In February, P. Gainlall was appointed overseer by the council.⁶⁸ Premsingh and Dagleish had persuaded him to take back his former job.⁶⁹ Again the factional competition continued. For example, in 1940, Jacob Panchar, serving as agent for the owner of the house Gainlall rented, summoned Gainlall for non-payment of rents knowing that the Local Authority owed him salary for that same period. The day after Panchar obtained judgment, he informed Gainlall that he was raising his rent.⁷⁰

Arenas of Co-Operation and Alliance

It has been noted that "there are instances of factions co-operating with one another, of factional 'coalition' or 'alliances'" (Nicholas, 1965: 44). Such a view simplifies a more complex dynamic by ignoring the ego-centred nature of factional sets and the fact that factionalism is located within a wider socio-economic context and pattern of potential conflict. Factional sets, as products of leadership strategies, do not form alliances; rather, leaders' interests sometimes may require strategies other than factional politics because of the pursuit of particular goals. The two millers who competed against each other were, in the wider context, the elite of the village in opposition to the mass. In this frame of reference, they were competing with non-elites to maintain their position and the status quo. As a class and as the major political-economic protagonists, the elite together defended their position and privileges. Factional alliances are simply situations in which class boundaries form

66 *Ibid.*, and Letter from J. Panchar and T. Bhagwandin to the Local Government Board, February 16, 1938.

67 This was rationalized by Ramprashad on the grounds that he did not know the full facts of the case because the November and December minutes were incorrectly written. (Letter from the District Commissioner, New Amsterdam, to the Secretary, Local Government Board, February 24, 1938.) In fact, P. Gainlall had been approached about his reappointment. He was waiting to accept and was a Ramprashed supporter. (Interview with P. T. Premsingh, October, 1969.)

68 Minutes of the Meeting of the Rajgahr Village Council, February 21, 1938.

69 Interview with P. T. Premsingh, October, 1969.

70 Letter from P. Gainlall, Overseer, Rajgahr Village, to the District Commissioner, December 17, 1940.

because horizontal village cleavages become more critical for leadership strategies than vertical cleavages.

For example, when the Ramprashad council announced its decision, amid much conflict, to reinstate Dookhun as overseer, four dissatisfied villagers nailed a board across the village office. At a special meeting convened to discuss the issue, the council unanimously passed a motion which stated that:

Whereas the attitude of certain villagers appears to be a spreading danger to 'village administration' and an incentive to cause a breach of the peace much to the annoyance of His Majesty's peaceful subjects, be it resolved that this council, with an endeavour to put a period to such hostile acts, unhesitatingly agrees to retain council and prosecute in a court of law the offenders named above.⁷¹

In 1935, the council unanimously decided to waive fixed rents and to institute a system of charging rents based on bags of padi reaped.⁷² Such a system, however, was known to be highly fallible. Farmers could fill bags fuller than usual to reduce the total number, or alternately, farmers who had a good crop would pass another's padi as their own so that the other person would have fewer bags and so pay less rent. The saving was then split. The only control was to have a strict tabulation of yields. The District Commissioner insisted, and the council agreed, that the ranger and Crown dam watchman should do this and should be accompanied at all times by two councillors.⁷³ No councillors ever accompanied the ranger;⁷⁴ all council members were planting in the area, and all received rent reductions because of poor yields.

Resource Management and Social Networks

Table 4.3 provides a summary of the structural features of the miller period. From it we can see the patterns of competitive eligibility; the strategies of factional mobilization, deployment and maintenance; and the subsequent composition of factional sets when viewed as networks. The first point to be noted is that the stratification pattern (Column B) was rigid and the goal of absolute village control was accessible only to the economic elite, the millers. Because of this, other features, such as eligibility and team structure, were based on the needs and demands of this elite

71 Minutes of a Special Meeting of the Rajgahr Village Council, February 11, 1938.

72 Letter from P. Gainlall, Overseer, Rajgahr Village, to the District Commissioner, New Amsterdam, November 20, 1935.

73 Letter from the District Commissioner, New Amsterdam, to the Chairman, Rajgahr Village, December 11, 1935.

74 Letter from P. Gainlall, Overseer, Rajgahr Village, to the District Commissioner, New Amsterdam, December 23, 1935.

leadership: they made the "rules". All villagers were defined as the political community (Column C) with internal loyalties (the partial network, Column E) based on the mill to which their padi was brought (Column D). From this "political elite" (Column C), the millers mobilized/deployed their factional sets (Column F) by using (Action-Set # 1, Column E) additional criteria (Column D; level 3). From

Table 4.3: Stratification, Competitive Eligibility and Factional Category

(A) Level	(B) Stratification Pattern	(C) Levels/ Eligibility for Recruitment ⁷⁵	(D) Mobilization Criteria		(E) Network Definition	(F) Factional Category
			Economic Sphere	Social Sphere		
1	Mass	Political Community			Total Network	
2	Elite	Political Elite	Mill Clients; Transactions	Kinship; Friendship	Partial Network	
3	Miller (Leader)		Clients with Patrons; Exchanges	Kinship; Friendship	Action Set # 1	Factional Support
4	Team				Action Set # 2	

these supporters, they deployed (Action-Set # 2, Column E) teams (Column C) for particular encounters. Deployment decisions at this level were based on the type of link, and hence, the projected loyalty of the political elite who had been mobilized by Action-Set # 1 to the factional set. Team membership, however, also had a voluntary aspect. Since greater payoffs were made as compared with factional or elite mobilization, the incentives for volunteers were great. The miller thus deployed his team taking into account the strength of the link from among those who had the time and resources to volunteer.

The most trusted tie for mobilization/deployment was that of kinship, with effectiveness diminishing in proportion to distance and pre-existing rivalries. Panchar's strategy, and Maraj's, provide a case in point. Both concentrated on extended kin ties but were not always successful in activating these. Part of the Jaikarran line defected/was mobilized away because of a family quarrel related to the economic ties it had with Ramprashad. Conversely, Panchar successfully mobilized second-order ties with the Bhagwandins and Loknauths.

In contrast, Ramprashad had few kinship ties except for first-order kin and had to mobilize by using friendship and patron-client relationships. Friendship ties were

⁷⁵ After Bailey, 1969.

effective since, although the personnel were generally unindebted and although these relationships were therefore expensive to maintain, they were unlikely to be subverted. For example, Preamsingh was given a major role on council. This resulted in a direct encounter with Panchar and thereafter Preamsingh's loyalty was ensured. The patron-client link derived from multiple transactions and indebtedness. This occurred in the incident involving Panchar and Mohamed; long-term transactions and the obligations of the tie required Panchar to lend active support to Mohamed's claim. Similarly, Ramprashad was trying to create a patron-client tie with Bhola through multiple exchanges over time.

Another type of link for securing support at the factional level evolved by exploiting schisms which occurred between the other leader and his supporters. Dagleish's wife's antipathy toward Maraj over the mill foreclosure was a case in point as was Ramdharry's land dispute. Ultimately, the schism solidified the tie between Ramprashad and Preamsingh. Depending on the intensity of the schism, such links were relatively secure.

The final tie mobilized by leaders was the transactional relationship, the most tenuous of all as exemplified by Ramprashad paying Bhola's debt in order to develop a more secure patron-client tie. In the council arena, Panchar's nomination of Morrison for the chairmanship was an attempt to generate a transactional base for support. He succeeded in the latter case, and the transaction evolved into a friendship link because of Ramprashad's subsequent attempts to destroy Johnson's administration.

The millers thus used several strategies to mobilize from the political elite factional support from which they could deploy their teams. For the most part, leader and follower were tied by several links: first-order kinship generally implied economic involvement with the miller; relationships which began as schisms often became friendships; and friendship links often implied symmetrical economic exchange, etc. Multiple links, however, tended to create more loyal support.

The strategies used by leaders for mobilizing factional sets between 1926 and 1942 can be summarized. Table 4.4 lists those persons known to have been mobilized because they competed for a council seat or nominated a council candidate. The "content" of relationships in an ego-centred network (Mitchell, 1969), or one of the "interactional criteria", is thereby obtained. Immediately apparent are certain fundamental differences in strategy coupled with particular similarities (Table 4.5). Both leaders used the patron-client relationship as their foremost tactic, clearly because of the way in which the political elite was defined and because the patron-client tie formed the basis for stratification. Economic exchange relationships as political strategy were also equally important for the two leaders. However, Ramprashad mobilized, as importantly as his patron-client link, the friendship tie; for Panchar, this was the least important strategy. Conversely, the mobilization of extended kinship ties was critical to Panchar's strategy while it was least important

for Ramprashad. Additionally, the schism and first-order kinship were more important for Ramprashad.

Basically, the mobilization and deployment strategies reflect the resource structure of the period, the effects of ongoing factional politics, and therefore, the availability of particular modes of action as well as their absence. Succinctly put, "clientelist politics" were critical although in addition, Ramprashad emphasized friendship links and Panchar emphasized extended kinship ties.

When the lateral linkages between the supporters are analysed, the same differences in the pattern of strategies appear. Eleven of Panchar's supporters are linked laterally through extended kinship (cf.: Appendix VII), a logical outcome of original leadership strategies. There are no other lateral ties among any of his supporters. Among Ramprashad's supporters on the other hand, were three independent kin groupings: Ernest and John Ramprashad; the relations between Ramdharry, Jagdial, Jaigobin Singh, Dindayalsingh, and Rajaram Dabi; and the Dagleish-

Table 4.4: Mobilization Strategies

	Criteria						
	First Order Kinship	Friendship	Economic Exchange	Schisms	2nd Order (Extended) Kinship	Patron-Client	Transactions
A) Ramprashad's links with:							
John Ramprashad	×						
Ernest Ramprashad	×						
^b Rajaram Dabi		×					
Dagleish		×	×				
P. T. Preamsingh		×	×				
Dindayalsingh		×	×				
^c Ramdharry		×	×	×			
^c Jagdial		×		×			
Hussein Amin		×				×	
^c Jaigobin Singh				×			
Chandkarran						×	
Jurany						×	
^b Dookhun							×
^d Morrison		×					
Simpson		×					
Chandrakha						×	
Nagassar						×	
Rajkumari						×	
Permaul						×	
Azeez						×	
Bahadur						×	
Total	2	9	4	3	0	9	1

Table 4.4: Mobilization Strategies

	Criteria						
	First Order Kinship	Friendship	Economic Exchange	Schisms	2nd Order (Extended) Kinship	Patron-Client	Transactions
B) Panchar's links with:							
Johnson		×					
Jaikarran			×				×
Panday			×		×		
Manraj Maraj			×		×		
Darshanand			×		×		
^c Dookhun				×		×	
Bhagwandin					×		×
Loknauth					×		
Bandoo					×		
^b Ramdharry					×		
^b Jagdial					×		
^b Jaigobin Singh					×		
^c Rajaram Dabi					×		
Imdad Usman					×		
Seeram Ramhit						×	
Harbaran						×	
^d Parmeshwar						×	
Jai Panchar	×						×
Gangadeen				×			
Dial Dabi						×	
Deen						×	
Yacoob						×	
Abdul Ebrahim						×	
Jawahir						×	
Alladin Azam						×	
Total	1	1	4	2	10	11	3

Note.

^a In the lengthy period under discussion, the link between leader and follower may have altered over time. In such cases, all ties are included.

^b Indicates that the person, at some point, defected from the leader to the other.

^c Indicates that the person, at some point, was mobilized by the leader from the other.

^d Indicates that the person moved from a neutral position to the particular leader.

In cases of defection, the person is included in both lists.

Jurany tie. In addition, there was the close friendship tie between Dagleish and Preamsingh and between Amin and Preamsingh. Thus, because extended kin linkages were the crux of Panchar's strategies, his factional set had more extensive lateral linkages, also kin based, but fewer independent groupings internally than did Ram-

Table 4.5: Mobilization Strategies According to Rank Order and Cumulative Distribution

Rank	Ramprashad	Cumulative frequency computed per link		Maraj/Panchar
High				
1	Patron-client (32.1)	64.2%	34.4%	Patron-client
2	Friendship (32.1)	78.5	65.7	2nd-Order (Extended) kinship
3	Economic Exchange	89.2	78.2	Economic Exchange
4	Schism	96.3	87.6	Transaction
5	1st-Order kinship	100.0	93.9	Schism
6	Transaction	—	100.0	1st-Order kinship/Friendship

prashad's. This strategy created a factional set which was structurally very different from Ramprashad's (Table 4.6 and 4.7). Using the morphological feature of network density⁷⁶ (Mitchell, 1969; Barnes, 1968), Panchar's index is 44.9, Ramprashad's is 15.2. This extreme difference is of course a product of the Maraj-Panchar extended family network which clusters at 100 percent within both the Panchar and Ramprashad "sets". However, since it forms the greater portion of the Panchar network, the density is effectively increased.

Although Panchar's factional organization thus exhibits greater cohesiveness, this is delimited by other aspects of the sets. First, the distribution of multiple linkages between leaders and followers (Table 4.8), exhibits the different mobilization strategies but similar maintenance costs. On the assumption that multiple links give greater durability to the leader-follower tie, the proportions are almost identical for the two leaders despite variability in mobilization patterns. The task of resource maintenance was equally difficult/easy.

Related to maintenance is the proportion of asymmetrical as compared with symmetrical linkages used by leaders. First- and second-order kinship, economic exchange and friendship can be defined as symmetrical; patron-client relations and transaction as asymmetrical. Given the economic control which the millers exercised, symmetrical links were costlier since asymmetrical ties were often predefined by a villager's indebtedness and/or lack of alternatives. Ramprashad had to maintain high cost linkages for sixty percent of his ties; Panchar for 53.3 percent. Costs of factional maintenance are again approximately the same.

Aside from morphological comparisons of the nets which result from leaders' strategies, Mitchell (1969) also suggests interactional characteristics, the major one

76 "Density" is defined as "the extent to which links which could possibly exist among persons do in fact exist" (Mitchell, 1969: 18). The formula utilized is: $\frac{200a}{n(n-1)}$ (Barnes, 1968).

Table 4.6: Network of Ramprashad's Support




Table 4.7: Network of Panchar's Support




Table 4.8: Distribution of Multiple Links

Combination Type	Number of Persons	
	Ramprashad	Panchar
Friendship & symmetrical economic links	3	0
Friendship & symmetrical economic & schism links	1	0
Friendship & schism links	1	0
Friendship & patron-client links	1	0
Friendship & transactional links	0	1
Symmetrical economic & 2nd-Order kinship links	0	3
Symmetrical economic & patron-client links	0	1
Schism & patron-client links	0	1
Schism & transactional links	0	1
% of persons:	35%	34.2%
% of links:	21.4%	23.3%

being intensity. An initial step in defining this can be made by looking at subverted leader-follower ties and asking which ties were severed and created or, in other words, which were more intense (Table 4.9).

Table 4.9: Subversion Strategies

Movement from/to:	Person	Subverted Link	New Link
Panchar/Ramprashad	Ramdharay	2nd-Order kinship	Friendship/Schism/ Economic exchange
Panchar/Ramprashad	Jagdial	2nd-Order kinship	Friendship/Schism
Panchar/Ramprashad	Jaigobin Singh	2nd-Order kinship	Schism
Ramprashad/Panchar	Rajaram Dabi	Friendship	2nd-Order kinship
Ramprashad/Panchar	Dookhun	Transaction	Transaction/Schism
Neutral/Ramprashad	Morrison	(none)	Friendship
Neutral/Panchar	Parmeshwar	(none)	Transaction

Single ties were generally lost to multiple ties, thereby reinforcing the suggested relationship between multiplicity and durability. Second, on the premise that subversions were rational in that a supporter gained more than he lost, particular linkages or combinations were more binding. On this basis, an intensity scale can be derived. Assuming a distribution of weights between 1 and 4:

First order kinship is weighted at 4 since it is empirically the most secure and is seldom subverted.

At the other extreme there is the *transaction* which is given the weight of 1 since it is the most basic relationship devoid of any long-term responsibility.

Between these extremes, the links of *friendship*, *economic exchange* and *second-order kinship* are given the weights of 3 in the light of subversions in Table 4.9 and the situational material.

A *schism* in a personal relationship which has resulted in a factional alignment is given a weight of 2 on the assumption that its intensity is based on its negative quality. The *patron-client tie* is also weighted at 2 given its usual history of having been built up from the basic transactional tie and given the absence of emotional commitment because of the compulsion inherent in the tie.

Table 4.10 summarizes the application of this scale to all leader-follower relationships. Note that the set derived from Ramprashad's strategies exhibits greater intensity.

Table 4.10: Intensity of Leader-follower Ties

Intensity of	Leader	
	Ramprashad	Panchar
1. Total links in the network		
Mean per supporter	3.4	3.1
Mean per link	2.6	2.4
2. Multiple Links		
Mean per supporter	6.2	4.9
Mean per link	2.8	2.4
3. Symmetrical Linkages		
Mean per supporter	5.2	3.8
Mean per link	3.8	3.1
4. Asymmetrical Linkages		
Mean per supporter	1.9	1.8
Mean per link	1.9	1.8

In summary, the consequences of competitive strategies for the structure of the factional sets was first, an extremely dense structure for Panchar as compared with Ramprashad; second, equal maintenance costs for both leaders; and third, a more intense set for Ramprashad. Panchar emphasized structural strength; Ramprashad had interactional strength. Although products of different strategies, the factional sets of the two leaders can be viewed as "evenly matched".

It has been noted that the political elite of the period—the partial network—was defined by the transactional relationship between a villager and miller. Such relationships were often transformed by the millers into a patron-client or friendship tie. These strategies created the factional sets (Action-Set #1) discussed above. From these sets, leaders deployed teams (Action-Set #2) for particular political encounters. The most critical of these encounters were the village council elections.

The data available for the analysis of miller teams consists of lists of persons nominated as candidates for the 1937 and 1939 council elections and the two persons who signed their nomination papers.⁷⁷ The resultant digraphs (Tables 4.11 and 4.12)

⁷⁷ Letters from the District Commissioner to the Commissioner of Labour and Local Government, November 18, 1937 and November 20, 1939 concerning the Returning Officer's report.

Table 4.11: Networks and Zones of Nominators and Seconders, 1937 Election*





Table 4.12: Networks and Zones of Nominators and Seconders, 1939 Election*



* Underlined names were candidates. Others were nominators.

reveal first, that the two teams interlocked in the 1937 election with Premisingh's nomination of Loknauth. Second, for the same election, Ramprashad's team comprised two mutually exclusive digraphs, while Panchar's action-set is a single graph. The opposite occurs in the 1939 deployment pattern. Finally, the proportion of nominators who were themselves candidates both varies and alters over time. In 1937, 54.5 percent of Ramprashad's nominators were also candidates. This was similar to Panchar's team in which 55.5 percent were candidates. For the 1939 election, however, Ramprashad's proportion increases only slightly, to sixty percent, while Panchar's team becomes more "closed"; seventy-five percent of the nominators were also candidates.

These observations can be associated with the sociological context in which the elections occurred. By the late thirties, changes had begun which would ultimately, within a half decade, displace the rice miller competition and, by implication, the economic dependency on which it was based. Discussion of these changes is the subject of the following chapter. However, by 1937, councillors were elected, the economic base was beginning to expand and criticism against the miller hegemony was emerging. By 1939, these changes were gaining momentum. Therefore, between 1937 and 1939, as a reflection of the changes, teams were becoming more "closed", that is, there was a greater overlap of candidates and nominators. Additionally, the alteration between Premisingh and Maraj occurred between the two elections; hence, there was polarization between the leaders which precluded the interlocking of factional digraphs by 1939. Finally, the closure of Ramprashad's team into a single net and the concomitant division of Panchar's net into two units, reflects more general alterations in team structure. Specifically, the teams, or actions resulting in action-sets #2, distinguished two categories of personnel: nominators and nominees. Phrased another way, the digraph consists of villagers mobilized for an election in which some were given higher payoffs, that is, some were permitted to be councillors. Table 4.13 associates these two personnel categories for both election years with their relationship to the miller; whether or not they were asymmetrically-linked clients. It is clear that the payoff of a council seat was, for both elections and both leaders, made available to those who were not clients and who required higher payoffs. Occasionally high-cost links were used for nominating, but this was not the dominant pattern. Conversely, a client was occasionally permitted access to a larger payoff but this was atypical. Over time, however, there is a variation in the strategies of the two leaders. By 1939, Ramprashad was using more elites as nominators while no clients had access to a high payoff; Panchar had no elites as nominators while, concomitantly, more clients were being given access to council seats.

These observations can be associated with the patterns discussed previously. It was noted that the two teams had, by 1939, become polarized; that Ramprashad's team was a single unit while Panchar's had divided; and that although both leaders increased the proportion of nominators who were also candidates, Panchar's increase

Table 4.13: Nominators, Candidates and Stratification

	Nominators		Candidates	
	Ramprashad's Team	Panchar's Team	Ramprashad's Team	Panchar's Team
1937				
Elite:				
Symmetrical Links	0	1 (25%)	5 (83%)	3 (75%)
Mass:				
Patron-client Ties	5 (100%)	3 (75%)	1 (17%)	1 (25%)
1939				
Elite:	2 (50%)	0	6 (100%)	5 (63%)
Mass:	2 (50%)	3 (100%)	0	3 (37%)

was greater. Both leaders, in short, bounded their support structure (i.e., polarization) and employed strategies of closure. Ramprashad fielded a more structurally integrated team (i.e., the unified digraph) with limited access to the payoff. Panchar deployed a team in which most of those involved had access. Ramprashad was becoming more "elitist"; Panchar was becoming more "democratic". "Diagonalism" (Bujra, 1971) was becoming apparent in Panchar's strategy, while Ramprashad continued to emphasize vertical cleavages. Further, these different cleavages associated with the polarization between factional alignments, constitute the beginnings of a larger trend. In the present context, however, the effects were more immediate in terms of electoral success. In 1937, with a similar stratification base in the teams, seats were split. In 1939, Ramprashad swept the election. The reason for this success was because diagonalism as a strategy was not yet viable—too many people remained indebted and the stratification pattern remained intact.

That the old structural patterns could still override the new trend is also apparent from the morphological and interactional measures. More specifically, it has been noted that the factional sets exhibited two different strategies: Panchar emphasized structural strength; Ramprashad emphasized interactional strength. In general terms, the sets were evenly matched. What occurred when the leaders derived teams (Table 4.14)?

In 1937, when the teams were equally effective, the denser structure fielded by Panchar was countered by the greater reachability of Ramprashad's team. Morphologically, the two teams were evenly matched via different tactics. By 1939, candidates' density decreased for both leaders: polarization and closure around total support decreased the interaction which occurred solely among the high-cost internal elite, that is, the candidates. However, Panchar's decrease in density for the total net indicates that his diagonal strategy precluded the density possible when only elites competed. Panchar was sacrificing structural strength for more open access to the prizes. Concomitantly, Ramprashad's total density increased: horizontal closure increased internal interaction. The implication is that the structural equality between

Table 4.14: Morphological Measures of Council Teams

(a) Measures		1937	1939
Density			
Total digraph:	Ramprashad	20.0	26.6
	Panchar	25.0	23.9
Candidates' graph:	Ramprashad	40.0	33.3
	Panchar	50.0	38.8
Reachability ⁷⁸			
Total digraph:	Ramprashad	1.6	1.5
	Panchar	2.1	1.6
Candidates' graph:	Ramprashad	.9	1.3
	Panchar	1.6	1.5
(b) Observations			
(1) Panchar team as compared with Ramprashad:	Density Panchar more dense except for 1939 total digraph	Reachability Ramprashad "tighter" for all graphs	
(2) Changes over time from 1937 election to 1939	i. Candidates' net: Decrease for both leaders;	Increase for Ramprashad for total net; decrease for Ramprashad in candidates' net; increase for Panchar in both nets.	
	ii. Total net: Decrease for Panchar; Increase for Ramprashad.	Ramprashad has higher ratio of difference; ratio decreases for both between 1937 and 1939.	
(3) Ratio of difference between total as compared with candidates' net:	Panchar has higher ratio of difference; ratio decreases for both between 1937 and 1939.	Ramprashad has higher ratio of difference; ratio decreases for both over time.	

the teams was now offset since Ramprashad's total density was greater than Panchar's. The reachability measures indicate that this increased density, implying a stronger team, was perhaps offset by Panchar's increased reachability within both graphs. However, Ramprashad's reachability remained greater. From the structural perspective, Ramprashad fielded a stronger team than did Panchar.

The inequality of the 1939 teams is also apparent from interactional measures (Tables 4.15 and 4.16). In 1937, Ramprashad's candidates' net was the stronger while Panchar could match this with the interactional strength of his total net. By 1939, however, Ramprashad was uniformly stronger in both nets as a product of

78 "Reachability... implies that every specified person can be contacted within a stated number of steps from any given starting point" (Mitchell, 1969: 15).

"The sociological significance... lies in the way in which the links in a person's network may be channels for the transmission of information including judgements and opinions especially when these serve to reinforce norms and bring pressure to bear in some specified person. This is particularly important where links... lead back to ego" (Mitchell, 1969: 17).

As derived from Mitchell's description, the method of computation is as follows:

From a matrix of steps between all nodes:

$$\text{Nodes } x \frac{[(1 \text{ step } x n) + (2 \text{ steps } x n) + (3 \text{ steps } x n) \dots]}{\text{Total Aggregate Steps}}$$

Total Aggregate Steps

Table 4.15: Factional Sets, Action-Sets and Teams: A Comparison

	Factional Set (Action Set #1):			1937 Action Set #2:			1939 Action Set #3:		
	Ramprashad			Total			Total		
	Ramprashad	Panchar	Candidates	Ramprashad	Panchar	Candidates	Ramprashad	Panchar	Candidates
Zones									
4	(2) 9.5%	(1) 4%	(1) 16.7%	(1) 9.1%	(2) 22.2%	(1) 16.7%	(1) 10.0%	(1) 8.3%	(1) 16.7%
3	(10) 47.6%	(12) 48%	(3) 50.0%	(3) 27.3%	(3) 33.3%	(3) 50.0%	(6) 60.0%	(4) 33.3%	(4) 66.7%
2	(8) 38.1%	(11) 44%	(2) 33.3%	(7) 63.6%	(4) 44.4%	(2) 33.3%	(3) 30.0%	(7) 58.3%	(1) 16.7%
1	(1) 4.8%	(1) 4%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Total									
Intensity Per supporter Per link	3.4 2.6	3.1 2.4	4.3 4.3	3.3 3.0	3.3 3.3	4.3 4.3	3.9 3.3	2.8 1.8	4.3 5.2
Multiplicity Per cent of Persons Average Intensity of link	35.0% 6.2	34.2% 4.9	50.0% 6.0	27.2% 6.0	33.3% 4.3	40.0% 4.5	40.0% 5.8	16.7% 4.0	50.0% 5.7
Symmetry Per cent of persons; Average Intensity of link	52.4% 5.2	52.0% 3.8	83.3% 4.8	45.5% 4.8	50.0% 4.0	80.0% 4.0	70.0% 4.8	41.7% 3.2	83.3% 4.8
Asymmetry Per cent of persons Average Intensity of link	47.6% 1.9	48.0% 1.6	16.7% 2.0	54.5% 2.0	50.0% 2.5	16.7% 2.0	30.0% 2.0	58.3% 2.1	16.7% 2.0

Zones of Recruitment

Durability and Costs: Interactional Measures

Table 4.16: Observations on the Interactional Measures of the Council Teams

Measure	Panchar as compared with Ramprashad	Changes over time, From 1937 to 1939	
		Ramprashad	Panchar
1. Zones	1937 Panchar utilized closer zones for both total and candidates' nets. 1939 Ramprashad utilized closer zones for both nets.	Increase for both nets.	Decrease for both nets.
2. Intensity ⁷⁹	1937 Panchar more intense in total net, Ramprashad in candidates' net. 1939 Ramprashad more intense in both nets.	Increase in total net and in supporter index; the same intensity per link in candidates' net.	Decrease for both nets.
3. Use of Multiple Ties	1937 Panchar more multiplex in total net, Ramprashad in candidates' net. 1939 Ramprashad more multiplex in both nets.	Increase for total net; the same for candidates' net.	Decrease for both nets.
4. Intensity of Multiple Ties	1937 Ramprashad more intense in both nets. 1939 Ramprashad more intense in both nets.	Decrease for both nets.	Decrease for both nets.
5. Use of Symmetrical (high cost) Links	1937 Panchar used more symmetrical ties in total net, Ramprashad in candidates' net. 1939 Ramprashad utilized more symmetrical links in both nets.	Increase for total net; the same for candidates' net.	Decrease for both nets.
6. Intensity of Symmetrical Links	1937 Ramprashad had greater intensity for both nets. 1939 Ramprashad greater for both nets.	Same for both nets.	Decrease for both nets.

increases in his interactional strength and the concomitant decrease in Panchar's strength.

In terms of the practical implications, it becomes clear as to why the leaders each won three seats in 1937 and why Ramprashad swept the election in 1939. For the

79 The ascription of intensity is based on the same scaling technique utilized previously.

former election, the two teams were evenly matched in structural terms: Panchar via density, Ramprashad via reachability. Additionally, Panchar's interactional strength in the total net could counter the interactional strength of the team which Ramprashad deployed. By 1939, Ramprashad's increased structural strength combined with far greater interactional strength could totally override the Panchar team. Informants commented on the well-organized and high-powered campaign which Ramprashad ran in 1939. The network measures of the personnel deployed in this confrontation appear to substantiate this observation.

Why were the teams unequal in 1939? The answer lies in the constraints of the original mobilization strategies combined with the new constraints in the immediate environment. In the case of the former, Panchar's diagonal strategy conflicted with his original emphasis on kin ties and patron-client relationships; there were limitations on his deploying intense ties which were simultaneously asymmetrical. Ramprashad, on the other hand, in continuing to deploy friendship links which were both intense and symmetrical, had no internal contradictions. Strategies emphasizing horizontal ties and vertical cleavages remained more functional given the original mobilization tactics which were located in a wider sociological context of familial elitist stratification. Although criticism of rice miller politicking led to two different leadership strategies, Panchar's "democratic" strategy delimited his electoral efficiency because of internal contradictions caused by a resource situation in which vertical cleavages were still critical and elitist politics more viable.

Core Support and Followers

A major issue in the literature is the nature of factional cores and the degree of solidarity of factional sets. During Familial Elitism the involvement of particular villagers over periods of years indicates that cores existed as part of the factional structures over and above the basic "following". Further, the fact that transactional relationships evolved, in many cases, into more complex ties indicates that "cores" can be distinguished. How can this be done and to what degree did this core solidify?

Qualitatively, certain villagers were more intimately involved in factional competition than were others. Premsingh and Dagleish were obviously Ramprashad's core support as were Bhagwandin, Loknauth and Seeram Ramhit for Panchar. In fact, all persons who appear in Table 4.4 could be defined as core simply because their names emerge from the mass of transactional and exchange relationships in which all villagers were involved. At that point, cores would be coterminous with the factional sets. However, insofar as subsequent action-sets did not include all factional personnel, it seems more likely that the cores are related to team membership, but are not coterminous with such membership. This is because, first, persons who were no longer politically active by the late thirties were excluded from the

electoral set/team. Second, persons so deployed may not have been core support but rather, were merely being well paid through access to a council seat.

Despite these limitations, cores and solidarity can be dealt with via three possible measures. First, it is possible to count those who were deployed in the two council action-sets. Ramprashad's core support would thus consist of Dagleish, and Premsingh; Panchar's would consist of Loknauth, Seeram Ramhit, and Darshanand. This method, however, is limited; it excludes important persons such as Ramprashad's first-order kin. A second method can be based on Bailey's notion that "the structure of a group can be expressed as a variable derived from the core/support ratio" (1969: 283). The digraphs of nominees and seconders thus become relevant and one could assume that the candidates, given the high payoff of a council seat, constituted the core. As noted previously, the proportion of nominators who were also candidates increased over time. Therefore, if candidates and cores were coterminous, core was becoming more associated with team membership over time. Additionally, since the personnel being permitted access to team, and core, were a product of a more elitist strategy for Ramprashad and a more democratic strategy for Panchar, it follows that cores for each leader exhibited a different type of cleavage.

This association of team and candidature with core can be related to a third measure in which a density index of eighty percent is the criterion for distinguishing clusters within networks (Barnes, 1968).⁸⁰ When this is applied to the 1937 electoral sets, there is no clustering for either leader. When applied to the 1939 sets, Premsingh, Ernest Ramprashad, Ramdharry, and Dabi cluster at 83.3 percent within the Ramprashad digraph; Panchar, Dookhun, Usman, Bhagwandin, and Bando cluster at eighty percent in Panchar's graph. Cores were therefore becoming more important by 1939, probably associated with the emergent criticism of factional politics and subsequent strategies of closure and polarization. Of additional relevance is the fact that all persons in Panchar's cluster were candidates while one person in Ramprashad's was not. Panchar's diagonalism was limited—asymmetrical linkages, although given access, were not part of the core as defined by the density measure. Residual elitism thus was apparent while Ramprashad's inclusion of a non-candidate in his core does not imply diagonalism since that individual was a symmetrical relation, not a client, used as a nominator. Both leaders retained the elitist strategy in core support. Finally, both used only direct structures and both leaders' cores, given the density measure, were "cliques" (Barnes, 1968).

⁸⁰ Barnes in fact distinguishes between "cluster" and "clique." This distinction is not utilized here.

The Patterning of Factional Processes

What was the process created by the resource management strategies of the factional leaders and what was the relationship of the process to the resource structure? There was a multiplicity of goals for which factional leaders competed: controlling the village council; maintaining the economic hegemony; holding constant a differential prestige ranking; and finally, controlling the communication nexus between the various societal levels. Each of these was intimately related to the others; the ultimate goal was absolute control over the socio-political and economic organization of the village. With this base, leadership strategies produced a particular type of process. First, multiple arenas of competition were necessarily generated, that is, there were continuous competitions over minor goals with each winning encounter⁸¹ seen as a step towards complete control. The village was therefore the wider arena within which smaller competitive arenas were generated.

Second, leadership goals and strategies affected definitions of political eligibility. Since economic control was sought through competition for mill clients, and since this was in turn political competition, the juxtaposition of the economic and political spheres meant that the "political elite" was defined from the initial economic transaction between miller and villager. Subsequent exchanges were competitive factional mobilization and resulted in "factional sets". Additionally, particular encounters, such as council elections, necessitated the further mobilization of personnel from the initial action-set, or from the subversion of the other leader's support. The linkages through which leaders mobilized were thus affected; transactional ties were seldom used. Rather, emphasis was on intense and multiple linkages as a direct outcome of the way the political community and political elite were mobilized.

Ultimately, the combination of the above factors generated a factional process which was cyclical in nature and comprised of oscillating encounters and confrontations. The dynamic was one in which leadership goals produced competitive strategies within multiple arenas simultaneously in operation. The costs were high and a leader could never control/deploy sufficient resources to win all the confrontations which were occurring at any one time. Further, since political support was based on economic coercion, no one leader could mobilize the entire village. Even assuming that a leader controlled several arenas, the costs of maintenance, the need to deploy for still other arenas, and the impossibility of subverting all the other leaders' politico-economic support meant that cumulative wins were impossible. Instead, hierarchical goals, arena proliferation, leadership strategies, and eligibility patterns caused indecisive encounters vis-à-vis the apical prize and factionalism was therefore a process of recurrent cycles of confrontations and encounters. The above factors can be

⁸¹ The definition of "encounter" and "confrontation" are taken from Bailey's (1969) description.

labelled control mechanisms; competition theoretically could have continued indefinitely.

Variations within this general oscillating pattern are apparent from the situational events. There were encounters, confrontations, withdrawals, and ultimately, agreed-upon mechanisms to keep the oscillating pattern intact. For example, the clock incident involving councillor Harbaran was a winning encounter. It is unknown whether Harbaran was subverted or whether Gainlall tampered with the clock. The win, however, was only part of an ongoing process. Ramprashad's interference in the Ramdharry-Jaikarran land dispute is another example of an encounter as is the election of Panchar as minority chairman and the race club incident. Ramprashad won all. However, none of the incidents destroyed Panchar nor resulted in total control. The oscillating encounters over the village overseers is also an indication of the indecisiveness of particular wins. Additionally, competitions in several simultaneous arenas is apparent in the Bhola case, and in the attempted change of the village name. The Bhola case was part of the economic competition while the Rampur incident was part of the competition for prestige. Had Ramprashad succeeded in the latter, his political credit, with a village named after him, would have been overly enhanced. His failure due to the District Commissioner's interference prevented a serious imbalance between the leaders. The "miller game" thus had another major control mechanism; the legal right of the District Commissioner to interfere in village affairs was critical and protagonists involved him whenever an encounter appeared lost. In most situations, the strategy was successful. In others, it was not. For example, through this mediation, Panchar had Dookhun dismissed. However, he didn't know that another Ramprashad overseer, Gainlall, had already been persuaded to take the job. Panchar ultimately lost despite the presence of the mediator. In still other situations, the strategy of calling on a referee was not heeded. In the Harbaran incident, the District Commissioner viewed it as pointless to intervene, but also noted that such intervention was not critical. What is important is that although mediation may not have always been successful or available, when encounters threatened to become serious breaches, mediation did occur as in the race club and overseer incidents. It was an effective control mechanism and a strategy both leaders used, and both aspects perpetuated each other.

Collusion, however, was the critical control mechanism in the oscillating pattern. It was expressed in the periodic alliances between the two leaders—alliances precipitated by common threats or gains. Its source lay in the wider stratification pattern since although factionalism is the development of vertical cleavages, these take place in an environment which also has horizontal cleavages. In Rajgahr during this period, the entire strategical value of factionalism was linked to the fundamental division between elite families and dependent villagers as a result of particular economic conditions. It was this division which in turn divided the elite. The implication is that this elite had the common goal of maintaining its position vis-à-vis the

villager and the outsider. Ultimate control as a goal meant the maintenance of the stratification pattern and the economic and social relationships on which it was founded. There was no point in eliminating the other miller if the millers themselves were eliminated. This basic interest necessitated collusion. It also meant that both millers agreed on "the rules of the game"; both defined prizes in the same way; both used human and physical resources in a similar manner; and both had a common ideology and common values. The class position of the millers, as the critical control mechanism, underlay such secondary mechanisms as the use of mediators, the acceptance of common rules, and the legitimacy of particular tactics. It also resulted in evenly matched teams for council elections. Even in the 1939 election, imbalance did not result in total control since the common definition of goals, the simultaneous arenas, and the agreed-upon definitions of eligibility constituted other aspects of the factional process which perpetuated the oscillation as control mechanisms. The rice miller period of factional politics was an integrated game intimately linked with the resource structure of the wider community.